EU as normative power: case study of Transnistria by Pavalache, Aliona
 UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies 
 
 
 
Master thesis 
 
Aliona Pavalache 
 
EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER: CASE STUDY OF TRANSNISTRIA  
 
 
 
Supervisor: Kristel Vits, MA 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2018 
 
	 2 
 
 
I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, 
literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been 
referenced.  	
.........................................................................  
/ signature of author / 				
The defence will take place on 26th of January, Lossi 36, in auditorium number 307, 
 
Opponent: Stephano Braghiroli, PhD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 4 
Table of contents:  
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...…5 
1. NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE CONCEPT…………………………………...…7 
    1.1. Normative power concept……………………………………………………….7 
    1.2. Normative power Europe critique and appreciation……………………………12 
    1.3. Normative power Europe application…………………………………………..13 
    1.4. Normative power diffusion……………………………………………………..19 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND……………………………………………………24 
    2.1. General outlook…………………………………………………………………24 
    2.2. Involvement of the EU and other international actors……………………….....28 
3. METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………………..33 
    3.1. Research problem……………………………………………………………….33 
    3.2. Research questions……………………………………………………………...34 
    3.3. Research design…………………………………………………………………35 
   3.3.1 Semi-structured interview method……………………………………….38 
   3.4. Research limitations……………………………………………………………..43 
4.  DEVELOPMENT OF EU-MOLDOVA RELATIONSHIP………………………...45 
5. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS………………………………………………………....51 
    5.1. Economic situation……………………………………………………………...51 
    5.2. Political situation………………………………………………………………..63 
    5.3. EU boosts change in Moldova and Transnistria………………………………. .64 
6. DIFFUSION OF NORMS…………………………………………………………...73 
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………...83 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………...84 
APPENDIX (interview questions)……………………………………………………..90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 5 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Normative Power Europe concept earned its popularity since 2001, when it was 
introduced by Ian Manners. According to Manners: “the EU can be conceptualized as a 
changer of norms in the international system; and that the EU should act to extend its 
norms into the international system”1. 
 
The thesis is a single case study and its aim is to show if and how the EU is using its 
normative power to influence the behavior of the target country, Transnistria in this 
case. A separate importance is paid to the perceptions and acceptance of the norm taker, 
Transnistria in our case, and its readiness to change and accept the norms as a reaction 
to the actions taken by the EU. Transnistria has been described as one of the most 
resolvable conflicts; still it has maintained its status quo for 26 years, which is leading 
to a number of issues, described in the thesis. OSCE has undertaken the active role 
undertaken in the negotiations process whereas the EU was involved as an observer. 
However recently the EU has become more active in the region as result of its 
Neighborhood Policy. 
 
The relevance of the study lies in the fact that Normative Power Europe as a theoretical 
concept can be studied on a set example, and the results may indicate that the EU is 
having an effect on Transnistria. The theoretical framework in the first chapter has 
reviewed the critique addressed to the concept, in order to produce a more 
comprehensive result. The second chapter is a short historical background, important at 
pinpointing the roots of the cessation of today. The third chapter is a methodological 
description and data as well as research limitations. It is followed by a description of the 
general framework of the EU-Moldova relationship in the fourth chapter and the case 
study analysis is developed in the fifth one with the description of the relations between 
the EU and Transnistria. The actual diffusion of norms with examples from 
Transnistrian case is shown in the sixth chapter.  
 																																																								
1 Manners, Ian. (2001): “Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU”, European 
Community Studies Association Biennial Conference. 	
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The thesis is a contribution to the study of Normative Power Europe, since it describes 
the views of both sides: that of the norm maker – EU in our case; and that of the norm 
taker – Transnistria, for the purposes of the research. The findings are that despite the 
geopolitical interests, that continue to be important in Transnistria, the EU’s normative 
power shows effect. 
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1. NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE  	
Normative power works like water on 
stone, not like napalm in the morning2 
 			
1.1 Normative power Europe concept 
 
This chapter describes the theory of Normative Power Europe (NPE), its meaning and 
purpose, as well as critique. It is important to start by analyzing the concept of 
normative power, what it represents and observe if it can be applied to other state 
powers, besides the EU. The normative power concept has acquired different meanings 
depending on the context and it has been used before NPE theory emerged. Jepperson 
formulated the definition of normative power in the following way: „the ability to shape 
and determine international norms, with norms defined as „collective expectations about 
proper behavior for a given identity””3. This definition states the fact that norms are 
used as terms describing a state’s influence on other parties. In the interpretation of 
Diez, the normative power “is a power that is able to shape conceptions of the 
‘normal’”4. Makarychev describes norms as universal and essential and they are 
contrasted with irregularity, disorder or eccentricity 5 . Rouse’s understanding of 
normativity is a very broad one, he sees normativity in terms of “how we hold one 
another accountable to what is at issue and at stake in ongoing practices”6. According to 
constructivists, a norm refers to “collective expectations for the proper behavior of 
actors with a given identity”7. Stemming from these definitions, the normative power 
																																																								
2	Manners, Ian. "The EU’s normative power in changing world politics." Normative Power Europe in a 
Changing World: A Discussion, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2009): 9-24. 
3 Jepperson, Ronald L. "Norms, identity, and culture in national security." (1996). 
4 Diez, Thomas. "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power 
Europe'." Millennium 33.3 (2005): 613-636. 
5 Makarychev, Andrey S. "Rebranding Russia: norms, politics and power." WHO IS A NORMATIVE 
FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR? (2008): 156. 
6 Rouse, Joseph. "Social practices and normativity." Philosophy of the social sciences 37.1 (2007): 46-56. 
7 Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 	
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concept can be described as the power of norms, which are applied in order to influence 
other actors’ behavior.  
 
The EU is not the first normative power described, and the concept can be observed in 
the practices of states like the US or Russia, for example. The discussion of the 
historical aspect of the normative power exists at the conceptual level and in the 
external policy of other influential states, the difference being the mechanisms of 
implementation. The characteristic aspect of the EU that distinguishes it from other 
state-powers is that through the Normative Power Europe, the EU puts emphasis on the 
values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The main difference 
observed is that the EU is concerned to represent the image of a peaceful Europe and it 
is more focused on regional and less on global aspirations, with an emphasis on 
different and not only military means of influence and a lack of ‘missionary spirit’ in 
comparison with the US National Security Strategy”8. When we compare the EU with 
Russia in terms of normativity, there is a different approach in both cases. The 
European identity is constructed in opposition to its past through the concept of the past 
as other, whereas the Russian perception on itself is that of a country whose identity is 
deeply rooted in the past9.  
 
During the last few decades, the European Union has increasingly tried to characterize 
itself as an entity guided by moral standards and rules agreed by all member states. This 
self-conception also guides EU’s foreign policy, where instead of military power, more 
emphasis is put on guiding by example, through promoting rule of law, or using 
economic and political means. As a result, the EU has been variously described as soft 
power10, normative power11, or civilian power12. These qualifications have been created 
in order to delimit the EU from the military and realist concept of power. When 																																																								
8 Berenskoetter, Felix Sebastian. "Mapping the mind gap: A comparison of US and European security 
strategies." Security dialogue 36.1 (2005): 71-92. 
9 Makarychev, Andrey S. "Rebranding Russia: norms, politics and power." WHO IS A NORMATIVE 
FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR? (2008): 156. 
10 Roselle L., Miskimmon A., O’Loughlin B. 2014. Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft 
Power. – Media, War and Conflict. Vol. 7. No. 1. P. 70-84.  
11 Diez T., Manners I. 2007. Reflecting on Normative Power Europe. – Power in World Politics. Ed. by 
Berenskoetter F., Williams M.J. L.: Routledge. P. 173-188. 
12 Duchêne, François, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: 16 
Europeans Look Ahead, London: Chatham House, 1972: 32–47.  
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distinguishing normative from ethical and/or civilian, Manners discusses that 
“normative is about how policy should be, how the EU should reconstruct the current 
practices”13. Manners argues that the EU represents a new and distinct kind of actor 
within the international system, and transcends the anarchic and self-interested behavior 
of states14. These claims indicate the unique nature of the normative power Europe 
concept, through which the EU acts as the force for good for other non-EU states. 
Moreover, Europe is perceived as a cosmopolitan entity15, advantaged in this regard to 
promote normativity in international relations and to give up on the argument of force. 
In this regard, the EU has promoted the trust of external partners, that there is a power, 
which can be seen on the international scene as a promoter of peace and democracy. 
The EU is perceived as a political model and a saving power, as an example for East 
European countries and other states in the EU neighborhood.  
 
According to Manners, normative power concept is applicable to the EU alone, and 
cannot be applied to other actors, especially not to the United States. He has indicated 
that the militarization of the EU risks making it more like other, traditional great 
powers, whilst leaving the problems of interstate politics precisely where they were”16. 
Hedley Bull, on the other hand, considers that the EU has to gain military power in 
order to be an international actor 17. Ian Manners argues that after the Cold War, the 
civilian and military power are not enough to describe what the EU is and that besides 
being military and civilian, the EU is a normative power18. Normative Power Europe 
theory states that the EU is a new and unique international actor, a “sui generis” case. 
The notion of normative power is used to refer to the power of norms, to the way these 
norms are interpreted. Former President of the European Commission José Manuel 
Barroso declared that the EU is “one of the most important, if not the most important 
normative power in the world. […] There is not another case […] where the United 																																																								
13 Diez, Thomas, and Ian Manners. "10 Reflecting on normative-power Europe." Power in world 
politics 173 (2007). 14	Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40,235-258.	
15 Beck, U., Pouvoir et contre-pouvoir à l’ère de la mondialisation, 2003 
16 Manners, ‘NPE reconsidered’, 194–195.   
17 Bull, Hedley. "Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?." JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 21.2 (1982): 149-170. 
18 Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40,235-258. 
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States or China or Russia, has been able to have so many other countries following their 
patterns”19.  
 
The Normative Power Europe concept has been developed by Ian Manners in 2002 and 
it has become widely used in policy debates and in academic studies on external 
relations of the European Union. Manners claims that the European Union can be seen 
as a normative power; one that diffuses internal norms in its external relations20. 
According to Manners, the EU should act to extend its norms into the international 
system21. The normative power as described by Manners is seen to focus on following 
aspects: “Normativity in the sense of inviting value judgments on what is desirable, a 
form of power that works through immaterial channels, and a type of actor with a 
particular normative identity22. Manners described three meanings of normative power: 
the first meaning of normative power is the emphasis on normative theory, that is how 
we judge and justify truth claims in social science23. The second meaning of normative 
power is a form of power that is ideational rather than physical, the emphasis being on 
the ability to use normative influence, rather than physical force. And the third meaning 
of normative power is a characterization of an ideal type of international actor24. 
Manners has further identified the roots of the different nature of NPE. According to 
Manners, this difference is rooted in three sources: historical context (legacy of two 
destructive wars), hybrid polity (the features of the Union as a post-Westphalian order 
with institutions of supranational and international levels), and political-legal 
constitutionalism25. 
 
The EU is represented as normative power in the relation between the actors of the 
international system and tends to extend its own model to other states by means of 
diffusion mechanisms. Normative Power Europe becomes an instrument of its external 																																																								
19 European Commission official website, http://www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf 
(accessed 05.03.2017). 
20 Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: The international role of the EU." (2002). 
21 Idem 
22 Manners, Ian. "The European Union’s normative power: critical perspectives and perspectives on the 
critical." Normative Power Europe. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. 226-247. 
23 Ibid 24	Ibid	
25 Manners, Ian. "Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?." JCMS: Journal of common 
market studies 40.2 (2002): 235-258. 
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action. The conceptual debate on the manner in which the EU acts on the international 
scene has started in the context of the Cold War. NPE is rooted in the strategic thinking 
over the role EU sees itself playing on the international scale. After the end of the Cold 
War, the EU has promoted values, which were lacking in former communist countries, 
like for example democracy and the respect for human rights (the promotion of these 
values shall not constitute a detailed subject of research in the thesis, except for 
occasionally referring to them where relevant to the topic of normative power). The 
EU’s constitution as an “elite-driven, treaty based, legal order,” means that its identity 
and behavior are fundamentally based upon a set of common values26. Among the most 
significant values there are: peace, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance27. 
Manners referred to standards, which constituted “European values” and these standards 
are the objectives foreseen by the Treaty of the European Union, obligatory for the 
member states and for the associated countries 28. Manners argues that the EU norms 
have a different nature than those promoted by other international actors.  
 
Even if the normative power concept has appeared in 2002, similar notions have been 
discussed already during the 1970s, that is of the civilian power Europe. For Duchêne29, 
for instance, the European Union is the force, which diffuses civil values and 
democracy on an international scale. He was the first one to point out that the EU was a 
new form of actor. The author suggests that the EU can impose its civilian power to 
other communities as a modus operandi, meaning that the EU implicitly undertakes the 
role of an active international actor. Duchêne also mentions that the EU is a new stage 
of the political civilization, overcoming the previous formula of military powers. 
However, this concept is considered flawed and obsolete.  
 
Manners introduced a new vision of the EU as the shaper of norms. The normative 
principles are not exclusively European, these represent universal practices of the 																																																								
26 Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40, 235-258. 
27 Ibid 
28 Kavalski E. 2013. The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe and 
Normative Power China in Context. – Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 48. No. 2. P. 247-267.   
29 Duchêne, François. "Europe’s role in world peace." Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look 
ahead 43 (1972). 
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international community, especially in the post-Cold War setting. Lucarelli and 
Manners mention that the universal principles are internalized and converted into 
guiding principles of the EU. Therefore, each broad principle is given a European 
reading before channeled into relations with third parties30. Another important aspect 
for the theoretical part shall relate to the manner of diffusion of the normative power. 
Manners has identified several types which contribute to the diffusion of the European 
norms in international relations. These are: contagion, informational, procedural, and 
transference diffusion, overt diffusion and cultural filter. These factors shall serve as 
framework of analysis for current work and will be described in more detail in the 
following sub-chapters of the theoretical part. 
 
1.2 Normative power Europe critique and appreciation 
The article of Manners from 2002 resulted in both critiques and appreciations. The 
concept developed by Manners was subject to a number of critiques with regard to the 
normative approach, because there is an important accent placed on the norms and 
values as the external policy of the European Union. The critics of this concept 
recognize the attractiveness and the popularity of the idea, proposed first by Duchêne as 
civilian power and developed further by Manners as normative power. These critiques 
are brought up by the realist and Neorealist School, in particular. In the opinion of 
Hyde-Price31, the normative approach of power cannot describe the entire mission of the 
EU on international scale. According to Hyde-Price, liberal-idealist concepts of 
‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ power neglect the underlying dynamics of military and 
economic power. In his opinion, “the EU is far from being a normative power whose 
influence derives from what it is rather than what it does”32. 
 
Sjursen, another scholar who criticized normative power Europe, indicated that 
normative power within the international system needs to be further specified, and that 
explicit criteria for assessing if the EU’s putative pursuit of norms is legitimate, are 
																																																								
30 Manners, Ian, and Sonia Lucarelli. "Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy." (2006). 
31  Hyde-Price, Adrian. "‘Normative’power Europe: a realist critique." Journal of European public 
policy 13.2 (2006): 217-234. 32	Ibid. 
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necessary33. Merlingen, although recognizing the debate around NPE concept to be an 
interesting and a theoretically sophisticated one, also considers that NPE is lead by self-
interest. Merlingen has the opinion that the power of the EU creates arbitrary 
relationships between the internationals, the EU, and the locals, the population of 
especially conflict-ridden areas affected by the EU’s foreign policy34.  
 
Another wave of critique to the concept of normative power is brought by Russian 
authors35. In the public discourse of Russia, the EU is masking its intentions of 
expansion by promoting normative power. The rise of interest of Russian scholars 
towards the nature of the EU as international actor and the justification of the normative 
power appeared with the ideological crises of Russia after the Cold war. The Russian 
view on the external policy of the EU holds to the interpretation of norms36. The EU is 
seen in contradiction both with Russia as an international actor, as well as with the 
regions of interest for Russia. Russian scholars critiqued the theory by stressing that “it 
is nonsense to imagine a single world community with some sort of unified system of 
values, cultures, single way of life and single stereotypes and standards”37. According to 
Romanova, Russia has challenged the EU’s normative power by arguing that 
international relations have to be based on interests rather than values, and that values 
promotion is hypocritical, concealing real geopolitical intentions and leading to 
unnecessary politicization of the human rights agenda38. These actions denote that 
Russia strives to re-establish equality with the EU and wants to be considered as an 
equal partner.  
 
There is a competition of values that takes place between Russia and the EU, and this is 
why it is important to establish the understanding of the relation of interests and values. 																																																								
33 Sjursen, Helene. Civilian or military power?: European foreign policy in perspective. Routledge, 2013. 
34 Merlingen, Michael. "Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe'." Security 
Dialogue 38.4 (2007): 435-453. 
35 Нарочницкая Н. Является ли Россия частью Европы? [Электронный ресурс] / Н. Нарочницкая // 
Фонд исторической перспективы : сайт. - URL: http://www.perspektivy.info/print.php?ID= 36255 
36 Solomon T. 2014. The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power. – European Journal of International 
Relations. Vol. 20. No. 3. P. 720-741. 
37 Gadzhiev, K. (2008) ‘O polze i ushcherbnosti “universalnykh tsennostei”’, Mirovaya ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 5.  
38 Tatiana Romanova (2016) Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power: Change and Continuity, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 68:3, 371-390. 
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The EU is targeting its near abroad which is intended to be as a test ground for its 
normative power, and this makes part of the geopolitical contest between Russia and the 
EU. It has been considered that: “both Russia and the EU focus in their policies on the 
support of the elites”39. Consequently, there can be identified a normative conflict 
between Russia and the EU, which has manifested itself in the events that took place in 
Ukraine, but is also observable in Transnistria, and other regions of interest of the 
Russian Federation40.  
 
These authors are relevant to the research under consideration, in order to verify the 
functionality of the external policy of the EU as a Normative Power in Transnistria. 
Thus, the critiques of the normative power concept refer to the real consequences of its 
implementation in the external policy of the EU. In this way, the problem of effects of 
this normative power is raised41. Both the followers as well as the critics of the concept 
of normative power Europe do not deny its usefulness for approaching the EU on 
international scene. As an example, the concept is seen by Hurrel as a standard in 
building an original political model of the EU, under its theoretical aspect of building a 
European vision of international relations42. In his work, “Normative power Europe: a 
realist critique” Adrian Hyde-Price offered a neorealist analysis and critique of notions 
of the EU as a “normative” or “civilian” power. It argues that structural realist theory 
can shed considerable light on the emergence, development and nature of EU foreign 
and security policy cooperation. He argues that the EU is used by its member states as a 
collective instrument for shaping its external milieu by a combination of hard and soft 
power. 
 
The normative power concept was considered an attractive one by some scholars since 
it represents a refined expression of the manifestation of power on international scale. 
These scholars, together with Manners himself, tried to refine NPE and explain more 																																																								
39 Nizhnikau, Ryhor. "When Goliath meets Goliath: how Russia and the EU created a vicious circle of 
instability in Moldova." Global Affairs 2.2 (2016): 203-216. 
40 Makarychev A. S. Neighbours, Exceptions and the Political: A Vocabulary of EU-Russian Inter-
Subjective (Dis)Connections / A. S. Makarychev // The Elephant and the Bear Try Again. - Brussels, 
2006. - P. 15-40. 
41 Smith, Karen E. European Union foreign policy in a changing world. John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
42 Hurrell, Andrew, and Terry Macdonald. "Ethics and Norms in International Relations." Handbook of 
International Relations 2 (2013): 57-84. 
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fully what it entails. Their studies have elaborated on the interpretation of the concept of 
normative power, and have given rise to other concepts, like ethical power 43 , 
responsible power44, structural power45. The derivate results can be considered as 
attempts to develop the concept further. The NPE concept was supported by many 
scholars as also demonstrated by being voted one of the most influential ones by the 
European Union Studies Assocaition (EUSA)46. Haukkala has mentioned with relation 
to NPE as put forward by Manners, that “the most prominent expression of normativity 
has been the work of Ian Manners on the EU as a normative power”. Haukkala has 
stated that “Manner’s ideas have proven to be highly influential but also equally 
controversial 47 ”. The evolution of normative power concept caused a better 
understanding of the limits of its utility in the external policy of the EU 48.  
 
The European model is one that inspires other countries to look for alternatives to the 
military power. Promoting the European identity as a normative power is found also in 
the soft power concept, described by Joseph Nye49. This concept has won popularity 
and is found in the discourse related to the international position of the European Union. 
The soft power concept competes with the normative power in the meaning of building 
an international identity of the EU. The search for normative backgrounds, which have 
been described in the theory of Manners and in the theory of other authors, are not only 
dilemmas of EU, but also make part of the global problems in the international relations 
after the Cold War. Still, the normative power has an implicit effect in the discourse of 
EU authorities at the external level.  
 																																																								
43 Aggestam, Lisbeth. "Introduction: ethical power Europe?." International affairs 84.1 (2008): 1-11. 
44 Mayer, Hartmut, and Henri Vogt, eds. A responsible Europe?: ethical foundations of EU external 
affairs. Springer, 2006. 
45 Holden, Patrick. In search of structural power: EU aid policy as a global political instrument. 
Routledge, 2016. 
46 University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, official website, 
http://politicalscience.ku.dk/staff/academic_staff/?pure=en/persons/323164 (accessed 20.04.2017). 
47	Haukkala, Hiski. "The European Union as a regional normative hegemon: The case of European 
Neighbourhood Policy." Europe-Asia Studies 60.9 (2008): 1601-1622. 
48 Bickerton, Christopher J. "Legitimacy through norms: the political limits to Europe’s normative 
power." Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (2011): 25-42. 
49 Nye, Joseph S. Jr., ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals of the American Academy, 616 
(2008): 94–109 
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1.3. Normative power Europe application 
The application of the concepts of civil and normative power of Europe highlight their 
external manner of action. Normative power is detached from the traditional military 
power and the reason is that normative power follows normative objectives that are 
found in the terms of the norms of foundation of the European Union. The European 
Union has undertaken international responsibility in the diffusion of its own model. 
This action is directed towards the external cooperation for the development of its own 
model, as a means to promote the human rights in the world. At first sight this concept 
seems to be too idealistic, however the EU wants to impose it on international arena at a 
level of principles of action. In other words, normative power has to become an inherent 
part of international political actions, and not an influential factor of EU extension, but 
serve as fundamental value.  
 
The application of normative power concept foresees a political vision of normative 
principles within a consolidated international framework. The application of the 
normative power concept highlights the fact that norms have to become objectives of 
cooperation and future development. In other words, by applying normative power it 
will be possible to reach a coherence of actions on international level, from the 
perspective of respect for the fundamental human values. An interpretation of this 
aspect can be seen in actions of EU enlargement, by including new member states into 
the EU, since the new quality of EU member state implies that the state assumes and 
implements entirely the European procedural model. In this case, we can observe an 
advanced form of procedural diffusion of normative power concept of the EU, as 
described by Manners 50. 
 
An important step in the development of competencies of normative power Europe, is 
the fact that with the entry in force of Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights became legally binding for the EU institutions and for national governments, just 
like the EU treaties themselves 51. The EU has applied and strengthened the universal 																																																								
50  I. Manners, The Concept of Normative Power In World Politics, “DIIS Brief ”, May 2009, 
http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2009/B09_maj__Concept_Normative_Power_World_P
olitics.pdf (last visited 24.01.2017). 
51 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm 
(accessed 12.03.2017). 
	 17 
values, as proclaimed by the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Consequently, 
the EU has developed mechanisms, which allow the creative and dynamic development 
of these concepts 52. In other words, the difference, although hard to perceive, is that the 
concepts which justify normative power Europe are not static, but are continuously 
developing, both at conceptual level, as well as at the level of implementing 
mechanisms.  
 
An important aspect of normative power development is not only the diffusion of 
existent norms, but also the capacity of the EU to delimit what is normal and to 
concentrate on the objective of reglementation. . Concerning the diffusion mechanisms, 
Gilardi mentioned that the diffusion is a consequence of interdependence and is not 
defined exclusively (or even primarily) by the fact that something has spread53. The 
adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 has given rise to a series of debates 
on the place and role of the military instruments in EU’s external policy. This question 
is one of the most frequently debated in the EU scholarly environment. The dichotomy 
of power (soft power versus military power) or the trichotomy (normative standard of 
power, the economic power, and the military power) is used, as a rule, as a conceptual 
basis for the consideration of this issue 54. 
 
At a distance of more than 10 years since the adoption of the Strategy, the events in 
Ukraine have given rise for new discussions related to the values promoted by the EU 
and normative power Europe. The problems of interests on international level are 
clashing with the conflict of values in relation with Russia, which has a different 
interpretation of power in itself 55. Without denying the importance of norms and 
instruments of regulation in EU external policy, it has to be mentioned that the EU is 
rarely eager to exercise methods of pressure and of military power or constraint towards 
third countries, when the power of conviction or attraction is not sufficient enough.  																																																								
52 Youngs R. 2004. Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU`s External 
Identity. – Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 42. No. 2. 415-435.  
53 Gilardi, Fabrizio. "Four ways we can improve policy diffusion research." State Politics & Policy 
Quarterly 16.1 (2016): 8-21. 
54 Feklyunina V. 2015. Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the Russian World(s)’. – European 
Journal of International Relations. P. 1-24. 	 
55 Sakwa R. 2011. Russia and Europe: Whose Society? – Journal of European Integration. Vol. 33. Is. 2. 
197-214.   
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The Normative Power Europe model is imposed, due to the nature of EU, and this 
model demonstrates the possibility to overcome confrontation by means of cooperation. 
Inside the EU, there is a complex system of international, transnational and 
supranational obligations, which ensure the distribution of competences to the member 
states. This hybrid nature of the EU as an international political entity leads to the fact 
that EU action in the world is rather limited, especially with regard to the traditional use 
of military power. Consequently, the normative power as an alternative instrument of 
influence is characteristic for the EU and is promoted internationally.  
 
The European Neighborhood Policy is applied as a framework for engaging the EU’s 
near abroad and for its norms diffusion. This instrument is providing an alternative to 
further EU enlargements and also attempts at disseminating the EU normative agenda in 
relation with the non-candidate states. The ENP actually brings benefits not only to the 
EU but to the neighboring states as well since it provides economic incentives in return 
for implementation of key reforms or aligning the national legislation with the EU 
acquis. This is an asymmetric relation of the EU with the neighboring states meaning 
that the objectives are set by the EU. The economic gains, or the material incentive is 
guiding the ENP and the EU is applying as a substitute to further enlargements and 
would produce a “ring of friends” with strengthened democracy and economy. It is 
important to mention that the diffusion of norms does not entail coercion and although 
conditionality exists, its effects are positive. The positive conditionality applied as an 
instrument among EU decision-makers and it also fits well the notion of normative 
power as it is a form of bargaining power and can be applied to create incentives that 
persuade partners to apply certain conditions desired by the EU.  
 
1.4. Normative power diffusion 
An important aspect for the theoretical part shall relate to the manner of diffusion of the 
normative power. This aspect shall constitute a framework for deliberative analysis 
within the Transnistrian case-study. The framework for diffusing the EU norms is the 
ENP and EaP instruments that the non-candidate countries are offered.  The 
mechanisms described by Manners contribute to the diffusion of the European norms in 
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international relations. The EU as a regional power is using economic incentives to 
facilitate the diffusion of its norms. The norms as described in the NPE are: contagion, 
informational, transference, procedural, overt diffusion and cultural filter.  
 
According to Manners, the contagion diffusion of norms takes place through the 
diffusion of ideas between the EU and other global actors56. This form of diffusion, also 
named pouvoir normatif is manifested in the way in which ideas and means of regional 
integration are diffused in other countries. According to Manners, these forms of 
diffusion rely on mechanisms of imitation and the attraction of ideas.  
These are the ideas that are considered to be worth of imitation, like “four freedoms”, 
“single currency”, “common high authority”, etc. According to Manners, the 
“environmental imperative” drove the EU to adopt early measures and “lead by 
example”57. The contagion diffusion happens by the way of diffusing ideas from the EU 
to other actors and it is more a passive way of diffusing EU norms, since mechanism 
works as a force of attraction and leading by example. With Transnistria being an 
unrecognized entity, it is challenging to trace-down this mechanism and the findings 
under this mechanism are scarce.  
 
The informational diffusion is a component part of the EU public diplomacy strategy, 
meaning that the norms are promoted through NGOs and non-state agencies. 
Information diffusion of norms takes place when reference is made to strategic 
communications, such as different EU policy initiatives, for example from the EU 
Presidency. Informational diffusion is the result of the strategic communication of the 
EU58. The informational diffusion relies on a number of mechanisms of initiation, 
declaration and communication including persuasive attraction and argumentative 
promotion of ideas59.  
 
The procedural and transference diffusion of norms is used by the EU as 																																																								
56 Manners, I. J. (2013). Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: Understanding European Union 
normative power in global politics . Cooperation and Conflict, 4(3), 304-329.  
57 Baker, 2006; Manners, 2000b: 39–49; Vogler, 2005 
58 Manners, Ian. "Normative power Europe: the international role of the EU." (2001). 
59 Manners, I. J. (2013). Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: Understanding European Union 
normative power in global politics . Cooperation and Conflict, 4(3), 304-329 
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encouragement for internal reforms since these factors entail technical assistance and 
financial encouragements to parties, in order to pursue internal reforms. The procedural 
diffusion of norms takes place through the institutionalization of relationships between 
the EU and third parties, involving political partnership as found in inter-regional 
cooperation agreements, membership of an international organization, association 
agreements or enlargement of the EU itself”60.  Such examples can be Association 
Agreements. A general framework for the procedural diffusion is the EaP, which among 
others, institutionalizes EU’s relationship with the Republic of Moldova, including 
Transnistria, and which is built on norms. The norms established in the EaP and are 
based on proceeds for their application serve as a next step for their consolidation. An 
example of the procedural norms are the EaP Summits, these represent both procedural 
diffusion of norms, as well as informational diffusion. Procedural diffusion relies on a 
number of mechanisms of partnership, cooperation, association and membership, 
including the persuasive attraction of ideas, the argumentative promotion of ideas, and 
the possible prestige and status of associating with the EU and other international 
organizations61. 
The transfer of norms is carried out when the EU makes exchanges of goods and offers 
help and technical assistance to a certain country. This fact includes also the export of 
standards and norms, which the EU is more and more eager to share with third 
countries.  
The transference diffusion of norms takes place when material and immaterial assets are 
transferred, like for example the humanitarian aid and technical assistance62. This form 
of diffusion can have conditionality clauses, and can be the result of more engagement 
of EU agencies with support for NGOs on the ground. This mechanism represents the 
number of actions like technical assistance, support, can take place in form of a 
dialogue, transference of ideas. Community norms and standards can be transferred 
through the exchange of goods, trade aids or technical assistance63. In addition, through 
humanitarian and development aid, institutional support, training programs to NGOs. 																																																								
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40(2): 235–58. 
63 Ibid. 
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The diffusion of norms is carried out by means of exchanges of goods, trade, aid or 
technical assistance with third parties through real or financial means. The norm 
diffusion can also be strengthened by use of political conditionality. Examples of 
Transference are the PHARE and TACIS programmes in Central and East Europe64.  
 
Manners also identifies overt diffusion and cultural filter as ways of expanding 
influence. In the case of overt diffusion, the EU diplomatic involvement and physical 
presence of EU missions influences diffusion of norms in third country. As examples 
are the European External Action Service delegations and embassies of Member States. 
According to Manners, overt diffusion relies on a number of mechanisms of presence, 
diplomacy or actions including dialogue, transference or enforcement of ideas65.  
And lastly, in the case of cultural filter - the EU’s values can be advocated and 
promoted through either rejection, or adaptation of the third party’s political and social 
contexts to those of Europeans 66.Norms can spread through cultural filter leading to 
learning, adaptation or rejections of them67. Kinnvall argues that the cultural filter is 
based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social 
and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion68. Manners indicated that the 
cultural filter becomes crucial in understanding how and by what means EU symbolic 
manifestations are interpreted during representation and reception.  
 
It is important to mention, that it is not always possible to make a clear-cut division in 
each case of the norm diffusion, since there can be an overlapping of mechanisms, 
while each of them work together to maximize the synergy. Also, due to the status of 
the ENP states, the most prominent forms of diffusion that are more prevalent are the 
transference and the procedural diffusions that are strongly applied by the EU.  																																																								
64 Ibid. 65	Manners, I. J. (2013). Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: Understanding European Union 
normative power in global politics . Cooperation and Conflict, 4(3), 304-329	
66	Manners, Ian. (2001): “Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU”, European 
Community Studies Association Biennial Conference. 67	Manners:2002, p.242-243 Manners, Ian, Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in Terms?, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, Issue 2, 2002	
68 Kinnvall, Catarina. Cultural Diffusion and Political Learning-The Democratization of China. Vol. 88. 
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Lunds universitet, 1995. 
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The EU is considered to maintain the character of normative power externally, so that it 
possesses the capacity to change the normative beliefs of other states. In this respect, the 
EU as a normative maker is the author who directs more or less persuasively the 
construction of a normative identity of the states under consideration, who are 
considered to be norm-takers, who are consolidating the norms to be diffused. The 
mechanisms which are applied by EU as a norm maker were implemented by the public 
figures with authority in the target states, NGOs and other networks of transnational 
institutions contributing to the diffusion. The terms norm-maker and norm-taker have 
been formulated by Jeffrey Checkel 69. 
 
In the case of diffusion, we can talk about both export and import of norms, which can 
also happen simultaneously. Additionally, norms transfer can be active or passive, 
direct or indirect, or the transfer from normative maker to the norm-taker. Because of 
this, there isn’t a standard of normative power diffusion. Certain approaches to the 
export of normative power seem more or less adequate in the case of Transnistria. In the 
case of Transnistria, the EU’s role as a norm-maker and that of Transnistria as norm-
taker act with reciprocity, since the norm-taker is not a passive role but there is a 
simultaneous exchange, a mutual relationship between the parties. When we refer to the 
transfer of norms, this implies the modification of normative beliefs in the absence of 
constraints of economic character, or any types of constraints.  
 
The status of Transnistria, during 26 years after the fall of the USSR has applied forms 
of constraint for conflict resolution. That is why discussing about a traditional formula 
for normative power diffusion in the case of Transnistria is difficult. The efforts of 
norms transfer in the case of Transnistria are testing the theoretical disputes of this 
concept, from the theoretical point of view. The export of norms is concentrated on the 
normative-makers, which offers a model of successful governing, which have to be 
mainly taken and implemented by the norm-taker. Accepting this model was not 
possible in Transnistria, mostly due to the fact that it would lead to identity unification 																																																								
69 Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe." International 
Studies Quarterly 43.1 (1999): 84-114. 	
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with the Republic of Moldova, a state from which Transnistria is trying to separate 
from. The socio-political identity of Transnistria is oriented towards the Euro-Asian 
model of the Russian Federation. The EU is engaged with the Transnistrian issue since 
it is in its proximate vicinity and it is officially considered to be part of Moldova, which 
is one of the poorest countries that the EU borders with, currently a member of the 
European Neighborhood Policy and striving towards future membership status. 
Negotiations on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict are still carried out with the 
aim of creating a format that would retain Moldova’s integrity. Despite being somewhat 
reluctant to engage with the EU, Transnistria has demonstrated pragmatism in their 
foreign relations, and appeared cooperative to an extent. But it can be argued that even 
if the Transnistrian government aims to engage with EU to a limit (in areas which could 
offer gains for the regime), norm diffusion still takes places within these interactions, 
and EU influence can be traced.  
 
The EU has manifested with good will the changes that take place in Transnistria. The 
attractiveness of EU normative standards in the case of Transnistria has a rather 
pragmatic aspect and this aspect will be discussed in details in Chapter V. Currently, the 
issue will be described from the methodological point of view and we will refer to the 
set of mechanisms of diffusion, in the particular case of Transnistria as a potential norm 
taker. The question to be answered is if the EU as normative maker was capable to use 
its power of transformation on Transnistria. In case of Transnistria, it has to be analyzed 
whether the norms are accepted by means of a voluntary borrowing of norms, using a 
success model or by copying the norm as a form of constraint. 
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  
 2.1. General overview 
The history chapter presents a comprised outlook of events that influenced the current 
state of dynamics as well as of main events describing the development of the EU-
Transnistria relations in chronological order. Transnistria is located between Moldova 
and Ukraine, separated from Moldova by the Nistru River. Etymologically, the name 
Transnistria means “beyond the river Nistru” in Romanian language. There are other 
names that are used along with that of Transnistria: “Pridnestrovie” – is the Russian 
variant of the name used by the Russian-speakers, which means the same – the land, 
which is across the river Nistru. Also, the name of the river Nistru has a second variant 
in Russian language: Dniestr. These differences in the proper names might create 
confusion. In some of the literature used as reference for the history chapter, the names 
of the river are used both as “Nistru” and “Dniestr” – and the names are kept in the 
original form by the author. Another variant encountered in the literature is the name 
“Transdniestria” – due to the usage of the Russian variant of the river Nistru. The 
official name that the self-proclaimed republic applies is ‘Pridnestrovskaya 
Moldavskaya Respublika’ or PMR70. Transnistria - Pridnestrovye - PMR - Transdiestria 
are all different names designating the same region. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
author is going to use the name that is conventionally applied by international partners 
like OSCE and the EU: Transnistria – for the unrecognized state, and Nistru for the 
river. Often, Transnistria is referred to as the left bank (of the Nistru river), whereas the 
right bank is used when referring to Moldova. The author is going to use these 
descriptions as well, since experts have used them during the interviews.  
The earliest records state that the eastern parts of the Carpatho-Dniestrian71 land 
belonged to the Kievan state already from the tenth to the twelfth centuries72. According 
to Laoutides, the existence of a Moldovan principality in the eastern Carpathian lands is 
																																																								
70 Transnistrian Republic of Moldova in translation. 
71 Here the name of the river Dniestr is the Russian variant of the name Nistru.  
72 Kolstø, Pål, Andrei Edemsky, and Natalya Kalashnikova. "The Dniester conflict: between irredentism 
and separatism." Europe-Asia Studies 45.6 (1993): 973-1000. 
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recorded in the fourteenth century73. According to Waters, an element of competition 
appears already in the very beginning of the history of the region indicating its strategic 
position, an aspect that reflects the importance, which the region will later assume in 
Russian foreign policy74. 
Figure 1.  Map of Moldova 
 
Source: http://www.moldova.org/ 75 
 
Before the Soviet period, Transnistria was a „classic borderland where ethnic identities 
were fluid and situational, and where Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Jewish and 																																																								
73 Laoutides, Costas. Self-determination and collective responsibility in the secessionist struggle. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2015. 
74 Waters, Trevor RW. The" Moldovan Syndrome" & the Re-Russification of Moldova: Forward Into the 
Past!. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2002. 
75 Moldova.org Information Portal, http://www.moldova.org/en/moldova-ukraine-mfa-reject-russia-duma-
accusations-blocking-transnistria/ (accessed 05.03.2017). 
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German influences combine to create a mixed culture” 76 . Transnistria is an 
unrecognized state and is considered to be de jure part of Moldova. The mixed culture 
of Transnistria is observed in modern times as well. During the 1989 census, before the 
conflict in Transnistria arose, in Transnistria there were 40% Moldovans, 28,3% 
Ukrainians, 25,4% Russians and 1,9% Bulgarians.77 The Transnistrian conflict, unlike 
the ones on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was not an ethnical but 
rather a geopolitical one. Historically, Transnistria was never considered part of the 
traditional lands of Romanian settlement78. The centuries of wars and the position of 
Transnistria at the crossroads of people and cultures have created a rather complex 
history of the region. Transnistria began to be colonized in the Middle Ages by 
Moldovans that crossed the Nistru river in search for free land and by some Tatars. The 
territory East of the Dniester River belonged to Kievan Rus’ and the kingdom of 
Galicia-Volhynia from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries79.  
 
Following the Russo-Turkish war of 1806–1812 and the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Bucharest, the Moldovan area between the Prut and the Dniester rivers was annexed by 
Russia in 1812 and came to be known as Bessarabia80. The Moldovan principality on 
the west side of the Prut, in present-day Romania, remained part of the Ottoman 
Empire81. Russian annexation of Bessarabia caused a massive exodus of peasants 
fearing serfdom and conscription in the Russian army82. In 1924, the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) was established as part of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic, including today’s Transnistria as well as large areas to the 
east in present-day Ukraine83. In 1939 USSR and Germany signed the secret Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact84, which foresaw the annexation of Bessarabia by the USSR, which at 
that time had been part of Romania for more than 22 years. Stalin merged Bessarabia 																																																								
76 King, Charles. "The Moldovans." Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanfort: Hoover 
Institution Press (2000). 
77National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova,  
http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234 (accessed 15.04.2017). 
78 King, Charles. "The Moldovans." Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanfort: Hoover 
Institution Press (2000). 
79 Ibid 
80 Roper, Steven D. "Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia." Regional & 
federal studies 11.3 (2001): 101-122. 
81 Vahl, Marius, and Michael Emerson. "Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict." JEMIE (2004) 82	Ibid	83	Ibid	
84 Alexandrescu, Ion. A short history of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Romanian Cultural 
Foundation, 1994. 
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with the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, which became the 15th 
USSR Republic. Transnistria became part of the MASSR.  
 
Whereas revealing the historical perspective is important for discussing the political 
situation as a whole, the origins of the current crisis can be found in more recent events. 
The relations with the separatist Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 
became a leading issue for the Moldovan government, after the secession. Starting with 
the 1980s, the USSR went through processes of transformation, culminating with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of December 1991. These transformation 
processes affected each of the Soviet Republics, and aimed at re-building national 
identity, culture and languages of the republics. The Republic of Moldova faced a new 
challenge – the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, which proclaimed its independence 
from Moldova on 2 September, 1990. The Transnistrian conflict started immediately 
after the proclamation of independence of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.  
 
After the declaration of Moldovan independence in August 1991, Igor Smirnov (leader 
of the separatist movement and later President of Transnistria) declared that it was 
necessary to protect the Russian minority in Transnistria from a possible reunification 
of Moldova with Romania, and it was used to influence the separatists for the purpose 
of creating the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. 85  On 2 November 1990, 
parliamentary elections were held in the majority of settlements of Transnistria, 
followed by presidential elections and referendum on independence. The election results 
revealed that 78% of the voters participated in the elections, with 97.7% supporting 
independence of Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova86.  
 
The years 1991 and 1992 were marked with clashes between the Moldovan military and 
Transnistrian paramilitary units. The tensions escalated until the war started in the 
spring of 1992. The cease-fire agreement was signed on 21 July 1992 and the fights 																																																								
85 King, Charles. "Eurasia letter: Moldova with a Russian face." Foreign Policy 97 (1994): 106-120. 
86 В. Ф. Грызлов, Михаил Николаевич Губогло, 1999. Непризнанная республика: Документы 
государственных органов Приднестровья. Центр по изучению межнациональных отношений Ин-
та этнологии и антропологии им. Н.Н. Миклухо-Маклая 
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stopped. The agreement foresaw the establishment of a peacekeeping force by means of 
including the Moldova, Russian and Transnistrian forces, as well as the gradual 
withdrawal of the Russian Army and the creation of the free economic zone in 
Bendery.87 During the period of time from 1992 until now, Transnistria started to create 
a new identity based on the term of Transnistrian people and to socialize the population 
towards the  Russian political space, rejecting European demands for democratization 
and conflict resolution. The identity is a social construct, and Transnistria has placed 
significant efforts to create a group identity. The population of Transnistria feels 
different to the rest of Moldova in 2017. This is also confirmed by the survey, 
conducted by Perspektiva Center from Tiraspol, in 2003, which concluded that 77% of 
the people from Transnistria call themselves “the Pridnestrovian people”88.  
  
2.2. Involvement of the EU and other international actors  
Gradually, the EU has become more involved in the situation in Moldova. The 2007 
enlargement has brought new neighbors to the EU, which were struggling with a 
number of internal problems that might destabilize the security situation at the EU 
borders. Through the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU has prepared a set of 
measures both the help address the issues that exist in the neighboring countries, as well 
as to secure its neighborhood. The aim was to foster stabilization, security and 
prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy89. In February 2005, the EU made an important step by signing the 
Action Plan, which will serve as a guide for the current relations between Moldova and 
the EU and an eventual joining of the EU by Moldova. The Both the EU and the USA 
were involved in the mediation process between Moldova and Transnistria, as official 
observers, while the process itself is led by OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, along with 
Transnistria and Moldova themselves – a so-called 5+2 format. Due to historical events, 
the EU did not participate actively at the incipient stage of the conflict. Also, at the time 
when the conflict sprang up, the EU was exerting less of its influence on the Eastern 																																																								
87 Kolstø, Pål, Andrei Edemsky, and Natalya Kalashnikova. "The Dniester conflict: between irredentism 
and separatism." Europe-Asia Studies 45.6 (1993): 973-1000. 
88 Оставная, A. (2009) Гражданская идентичность населения ПМР в контексте современных 
научных подходов. Политическая фальсификация истории, 151–155, Тирасполь.  
89 European External Action Service website, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en (accessed 20.05.2017). 
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states – this was not a priority for the EU at that time. The history of 5+2 negotiations 
started in 1992, hereby the author presents short points that list the main developments:  
  
History of 5+2 negotiations: 
• After the end of the armed conflict, in June 1992 the Presidents of Russia and 
Moldova – Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur – signed an Agreement on 
Principles for a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. On 29 June 
1992 started the deployment of the peace-keeping forces.  
• 8 March 1997 in Moscow the Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of 
Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed. It was 
meant to build relations between parties within frames of the common state and 
borders of the Moldova. 
• 20 February, 2002 started the negotiations on Transnistria in the 3+2 format, 
which included Moldova and Transnistria – the parties of the conflict, Russia, 
Ukraine and the OSCE – serving as intermediaries in the “Permanent conference 
for political questions in the framework of the negotiations on the Transnistrian 
settlement”.  
• In 2005, the format was transformed into 5+2, since the EU and the US joined as 
observers. 
• On 25 November 2003, Moldovan president Voronin surprisingly declined a 
proposed plan for settlement known as the Kozak Memorandum, which was 
foreseeing the creation of an asymmetrical Federation, with Transnistria and 
Gagauzia as subjects of this federation. The refusal to accept the plan was 
reportedly influenced by the EU, as the plan would have given considerable veto 
powers to Transnistria, which was seen as an opening for Russia to keep 
controlling Moldovan politics.   
• The 5+2 negotiations process has been slow to progress, and has stopped several 
times. The longest break was from 2006 to 2011. That was the time when the 
informal meetings of the Permanent conference took place. In 2011, the work of 
the 5+2 format was re-started. In 2016, one meeting took place in the 5+2 
format.  
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• In November 2017, another meeting took place in the 5+2 format. Before this 
round of negotiations there has been achieved a break-though in the negotiation 
process, which could not have been attained without the support and influence of 
the Austrian leadership of the OSCE. The 2017 round of negotiations are under 
the Austrian leadership of the OSCE. The topics of discussion have been 
decided upon and this fact has been declared by authorities and OSCE as being a 
progress. These issues, have not been considered to be the root problems, still 
the fact that there have been difficulties in the past to reaching consensus, and 
the results of the negotiations is considered to be a step forward which has been 
overcome towards future negotiations. The political representatives of Chisinau 
and Tiraspol have signed on 25 November 2017, 4 protocols on the main issues 
that have been dragging for at least a decade:  
o 1. The protocol on the functioning of the 8 Moldovan schools, which 
teach using the Latin alphabet in the Transnistrian region;  
o 2. The apostillation of diplomas issued by Transnistrian University Taras 
Shevckenko;  
o 3. Protocol on the usage of agricultural land, located in the Dubasari 
region, the access to which was blocked by the Transnistrian authorities. 
These parcels of land belong to Moldovan farmers, but are situated on 
the territory of Transnistria. During all these years the farmers had a 
difficult or no access to their land.  
o 4. De-blocking of the telephone lines between the two banks of the 
Nistru River, which have been blocked since 2006.  
 
It has been argued that the so-called de facto states’ conflicts are not “frozen”, but are 
dynamic and smoldering rather than frozen90. These authors also mention that the de 
facto states continue to exercise a tremendous hold over domestic political life in the 
parent states from which they separated. The current developments in the Transnistrian 
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settlement process demonstrate that the situation can change fast when the parties 
engage in a dialogue, despite the stalemate that has lasted for many years. 
 
Another breakthrough prior to the Vienna meeting was the opening of the bridge across 
the Nistru river, which is situated on the international road M14. The bridge was blown 
up during the 1992 conflict, and had been closed since then. The Sides of the conflict 
have reached a common decision on 3 November 2017 to re-open the bridge. The Head 
of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Michael Scanlan, called the agreement 
to reopen the bridge “an historic day” and expressed confidence that additional 
agreements would be reached within months91. Ambassador Wolf Dietrich Heim, the 
Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transnistrian 
Settlement Process has indicated that the reopened bridge “Opens a crucial civilian 
transportation artery, improves connectivity, can enhance trade and helps to build 
confidence between the Sides.92” 
 
These positive results have been attained for the first time during the negotiation 
process and can be pointed out as the success by the Austrian leadership of OSCE. Oazu 
Nantoi, one of the experts interviewed for this thesis, has declared for the “Europa 
Libera” news portal that the latest results in the negotiations “prove that the conflict is 
not inter-ethnical one, is not inter-confessional one and not even an internal one”93.  The 
decision-makers in this process are from the Sheriff Company, in the person of Victor 
Gusan from one side and Vlad Plahotniuc from the Moldovan side. Victor Gusan94 is 
considered to be the most powerful local oligarch, and he governs the Sheriff Company, 
which actually dominates the local economy95. More experts, journalists96 consider that 																																																								
91 OSCE official website, http://www.osce.org/stories/austrian-chairmanship-on-transdniestria (accessed 
03.12.2017) 
92 Ibid. 
93 Oazu Nantoi, “Ucraina are motive să nu privească cu ochi buni prezența trupelor rusești pe teritoriul R. 
Moldova în spatele său”, Free Europe Radio website, https://www.europalibera.org/a/interviu-cu-oazu-
nantoi-despre-noua-runda-de-negocieri-5plus2-de-la-viena-liliana-barbarosie-alexandru-
cantir/28883641.html (accessed 20.12.2017) 
94 Mihai Popsoi “Former Transnistrian Leader Finds Refuge in Moldova Amid Growing Tension in the 
Region”, Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 91,  
https://jamestown.org/program/former-transnistrian-leader-finds-refuge-moldova-amid-growing-tension-
region/ (accessed 05.09.2017). 
95Mark Gilbey “The KGB, some petrol stations & a former Arsenal coach: Meet Sheriff Tiraspol”,  
 https://www.fourfourtwo.com/features/kgb-some-petrol-stations-former-arsenal-coach-meet-sheriff-
tiraspol (accessed 15.09.2017). 
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the latest changes are due to the fact that these two persons have decided to defuse the 
situation. 
 
Secessionist attempts are, by international law, considered as internal problems of the 
state, which have to be solved by the state itself. Generally, there is no right to 
secession, although exceptions have been made based on the arguments that a national 
minority is severely oppressed and there are no other options to protect human rights. 
The situation in Transnistria did not constitute a persuasive example, when such a right 
for self-determination or secession was necessary to protect its people.  During the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, only the former Republics were allowed to become 
independent states, whereas the regions, which made part of them were not to be 
recognized as legitimate states.  
 
The problem is that Chisinau has no plan to solve the Transnistrian issue97. Also, 
Moldova did not elaborate on what it is going to offer to Transnistria. Currently, the 
Republic of Moldova is still a very poor country, even if it has been developing its 
economy. On the other hand, Russia is still offering solid monetary inflow into the 
region, with which Moldova cannot compete. To somehow address this issue, in spring 
2017 it was declared that the Government of Moldova together with experts is 
developing a Reintegration Strategy, and it happened for the first time after the 25 years 
of the conflict. Still, this is not going to produce the expected results since Moldova has 
not succeeded to create an attractive plan to offer to Transnistria and the biggest 
problems that Moldova is facing are huge corruption problems. The settlement of the 
conflict and the reintegration was not part of the key problems, which were important 
for the political class. This issue became current again in 2016, as part of the 
Presidential campaign of socialist Igor Dodon, since he introduced the state’s 
reintegration as one of the main issues in the presidential campaign, by means of 
federalization. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
96 Vladimir Soloviev, “Transnistria and Moldova have a deal”, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3479847 
(accessed 17.12.2017).. 
97 Артем Филипенко, “Приднестровское урегулирование: ждать ли прогресса?”, Day Kiev, 
https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/article/den-planety/pridnestrovskoe-uregulirovanie-zhdat-li-progressa (accessed 
20.12.2017). 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter is going to describe the methodological aspects of the thesis. It presents the 
research problem as well as the research questions, in order to contour the 
operationalization of the research problem. These will be followed by the description of 
the research design and the data applied, and lastly the research limitations will be 
presented.  
 
3.1. Research problem 
 
In this research paper, the Transnistrian case study is undertaken, with the goal to 
demonstrate the applicability of the concept of normative power Europe. The research 
problem, stemming from the aim of the study is the following: Is the normative power 
Europe having an influence of Transnistria? If so, how is it influencing the 
developments in Transnistria?  
 
For Eastern Europe, the supporters of European type of democratization have adopted 
normative power at the basic level of social reconstruction. The promoters of normative 
power diffusion in Eastern Europe are both actors from the European institutions as 
well as local actors of democratization in these countries. The political elites in the 
Republic of Moldova were no exception. These have assumed the European norms and 
values as a foundation for socio-political actions. Normative power diffusion in the 
Republic of Moldova has to be observed critically, under the aspect of the denial of a 
Soviet type of identity, which is perceived as centrally organized economy placing high 
importance on its military power. The association with social constructivism is difficult 
to overcome, especially in terms of correlating normative power diffusion with the 
social reconstruction of East European states neighboring the EU, after the fall of the 
USSR. 
 
Thus, the topic under discussion is the association between normative power and the 
undertaking of European identity behind the Eastern border of the EU. The EU external 
policy actions are perceived as undertakings to transform the identity in the former 
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communist countries from one type of the society: totalitarian and militarized society – 
to a society based on the respect for peace, democracy and human rights. Concerning 
this difference in opinions and perceptions on the normative power, as a form of 
identity, there are descriptions in the constructivist literature, where the norms are seen 
as identity constituents98. With other words, normative power had a constitutive effect 
on countries, where after the fall of the USSR a void developed in the perception of 
identity.  
 
In terms of generalizability, the lessons from Transnistria are important to learn from, as 
they have a potential to be useful in the future for the case of Donetsk and Lugansk in 
Ukraine. The conflicts have similar dynamics, as these cases do not represent 
historically long ethnical conflicts, all of these entities are backed by Russia, and the 
local population expresses their will to become more involved with the Russian 
Federation to the point of joining it, while the base countries (in this case: Moldova and 
Ukraine) are open towards EU involvement. The fact that the situation in Ukraine does 
not seem to be stabilized enough at this point prevents including Donetsk and Lugansk 
as part of a comparative study. However, once the situation becomes clearer, the lessons 
learned from Transnistria would be very useful for the EU and could be applied to the 
Lugansk and Donetsk situations as well.  
 
3.2. Research hypothesis and research questions 
The research hypothesis tested in this thesis is formulated as follows: 
 
The EU acts as a normative power in the case of Transnistria, and holds 
sufficient regional institutional mechanisms to influence Transnistria. 
 
The focus of the current study has been established by the research problem, elaborated 
in the previous sub-chapter and it indicates that first of all the thesis has to take into 
account the sources for normative power Europe and the influence they have. In order to 
establish the influence of normative power Europe, the following questions have been 
raised:  																																																								
98 T Diez “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’” (2005) 
33 Millennium – Journal of International Studies 613. 
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1. Does the EU follow a normative approach towards Moldova and Transnistria? 
Since the EU does not recognize Transnistria as a separate entity, its efforts are 
channeled towards Moldova as a whole, which included Transnistria. That is why, it is 
inevitable to observe what is the general framework of EU actions in Moldova, in order 
to single out the influence exerted on Transnistria. Secondly, in order to find out how 
the normative power is being used, the following questions have been raised: 
 
2. What are the mechanisms of normative power used by the EU in Transnistria?  
In order to answer the second question, an analysis based on the mechanisms of norm 
diffusion, as elaborated by Ian Manners are applied. With the aspect, the methodology 
takes into account the complex process of norm diffusion, which is produced as a result 
of the EU influence.  
 
Finally, in order to study the effects of normative power Europe has in Transnistria, the 
following question is asked: 
 
3. How effective has EU’s normative power approach been in Transnistria? 
In order to answer the third questions, the thesis has combined the findings to establish 
the general effect of normative power Europe on Transnistria.  
 
3.3. Research design 
 
The research design is stemming from the concept normative power Europe, developed 
by Ian Manners, also it takes into account various studies that have measured normative 
power Europe in a qualitative way, having in mind that the current research design is 
built on a qualitative method.  
 
Qualitative analysis. The thesis is applying qualitative analysis, which sees 
Transnistria as the unit of analysis, norm adoption is the dependent variable and the 
NPE (normative power Europe) is the independent variable, which affects change in 
Transnistria. The fact that qualitative research was chosen for the study of norm 
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diffusion gives an opportunity for an in-depth description of a complex situation. 
Qualitative methods offer advantages and some scholars, like Odell have considered 
them equal or superior for generating valid theory99. The qualitative research has 
analyzed the EU policies and the findings from the interviews in Moldova and 
Transnistria.  
 
A single case study has been chosen due to the fact that the cases that may seem similar 
to be examined in this framework are all facing different situations. The secessionist 
states which might be eligible for a comparative study: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, also the Northern Cyprus – these are all facing different situations 
which cannot be comparable: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is considered to 
be part of the EU but which is currently under occupation; Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are recognized by Russian Federation and have a status of partially recognized states, 
and they are not communicating with their base state Georgia, unlike Transnistria which 
is not recognized by Russia. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh – it is not recognized and 
there is no communication with its base state Azerbaijan, while in the peace process 
they are represented by their patron state Armenia, in contrast with the case of 
Transnistria, which itself is participating in the negotiations process, under the 5+2 
negotiation process. A single case of Transnistria merits attention, since the patron state 
– Russia does not recognize its independence, and on the contrary, its official stance is 
to support the indivisibility of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Some authors describe the advantages that the single case studies have when comparing 
to other methods. Odell, for example concluded that: “case studies are generally better 
than the alternative views for documenting processes”100. The scholars have produced a 
wide array of debates on the applicability of the single case study in the research and 
testing of hypothesis. Case studies are widely used and this method has a number of 
scholars supporting its strengths in the research. Flybjerg for example, argues: “the case 
study is useful for both generating and testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these 
																																																								
99 Odell, John S. "Case study methods in international political economy." International Studies 
Perspectives 2.2 (2001): 161-176. 100	Ibid.	
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research activities alone”101. In his paper he contested the misunderstanding about case-
study research, which were used to criticize them and produced thorough arguments in 
the favor of case studies as a solid method for research. Ragin, when referring to the 
case study, indicated that criticizing single case studies for being inferior to multiple-
case studies is misguided, because even single case studies “are multiple in most 
research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways” 102. 
One of the valuable conclusions promoted by Flyvbjerg was that “the case study is a 
necessary and sufficient method for certain important research tasks in the social 
sciences, and it is a method that holds well when compared to other methods in the 
gamut of social science research methodology103. Another scholar, Hawkins argued that 
“the case studies offer particular advantages to scholars…these include depth of 
analysis, construct validity, the identification of causal mechanisms, asymmetric 
theoretical arguments … and theory generation”104. 
 
Data sources  
The data collection has been carried out in two ways: first was the collection of data 
from the semi-structured interviews conducted by the author. Secondly, there have been 
studies the relevant EU communications and strategies, key policy papers, relevant 
literature, human rights reports, Freedom House index, journalistic investigations, and 
newspaper articles, statistical data offered by Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities.  
 
The resources introduced in the framework are compiled on the basis of different 
theoretical sources, e.g. articles from peer-reviewed journals, relevant books, in order to 
compile the theoretical section. The EU political discourse will also be taken into 
account. This will be carried out by means of existing literature and secondary data.  
 
 																																																								
101 Flyvbjerg, Bent. "Five misunderstandings about case-study research." Qualitative inquiry 12.2 (2006): 
219-245. 
102 Ragin, Charles C., and Howard Saul Becker, eds. What is a case?: exploring the foundations of social 
inquiry. Cambridge university press, 1992. 
103 Flyvbjerg, Bent. "Five misunderstandings about case-study research." Qualitative inquiry 12.2 (2006): 
219-245. 
104 Hawkins, “Case Studies”, The SAGE handbook of comparative politics. Sage Publications, 2009. 	
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3.3.1. Semi-structured interview method 
The interview method is used for conducting the research on the developments in 
Transnistria. Given that the diffusion of normative power comes down to peoples’ 
perceptions and also assumptions, interviews were used in this research to gain better 
understanding of how normative power works in the case of Transnistria. Transnistria 
will be analyzed as an identity, which since the early years of USSR constituency has 
been a militarized territory, as an outpost of communist type society diffusion in South 
East Europe. This aspect will be described in Chapter IV of the thesis, where the 
normative power diffusion mechanisms in Transnistria will be exemplified. As a result 
of initial analysis of available materials, the decision was to focus on interviews 
conducted with political and social decision-makers, with a view on normative power 
and its diffusion in the case of Transnistria. Coming from the idea that in the case of 
normative power diffusion, it has to show the experience of policy-makers or of any 
other actors, the obtained data has been integrated into a coherent system, based on a 
systematic approach.  
 
An interview is an investigation technique, which puts into circulation various ideas of 
political and public persons who avail of information. The term of interview has many 
meanings, the common features are the following: interview as a means of conversation 
between two or more persons, one of them taking the initiative and the control. The 
interview is conducted in a series of questions and answers, and the discussion has a 
well-defined goal. Ken Metzler105 gives the following definition to the interview: “a 
conversational exchange of information on behalf of an audience to produce a level of 
intelligence neither participant could produce alone”.  
 
The semi-structured interviews have been used to gather information on the diffusion of 
normative power Europe. Semi-structured interviews involve predetermined questions 
that do not necessarily all have to be asked, or asked in the same order in each 
interview. When conducting interviews with decision-makers, Aberbach and Rockman 
suggest that a semi-structured format is preferable, since “open-ended questions provide 
a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own 																																																								
105 Ken Metzler, Creative Interviewing, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1977, pp.16-21 
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frameworks”106. This format also allows the interviewer to explore unanticipated 
responses to questions107. These advantages are particularly important in the present 
context since the very aim of the interviews is to establish the frameworks within which 
policy-makers understand the world.  
 
The interviewees were chosen based on their experience and knowledge of the case. 
Contacts have been selected after browsing various think tank web pages, which have a 
specific emphasis on the Transnistrian issue, also some snowball sampling was applied, 
that is the interviewees were asked to recommend further people to be interviewed. 
NGOs and Transnistrian authorities – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been contacted 
as well. Various experts residing in the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria were 
contacted to answer the interview or to provide possible contacts. Approximately 20 
interview requests in Russian, 5 in English, 10 in Romanian with a cover letter and 
interview questions were sent to different experts and officials, asking for an interview, 
to be conducted personally or by Skype. The interview questions have been attached, 
see Appendix 1. All the interviewees were provided with the semi-structured interview 
questions in advance. During the interviews themselves, additional questions were 
asked for clarification. All of the interviews were recorded. For languages other than 
English, the interview questions have been translated into Russian and Romanian and 
the results have been later on translated into English after the interview.  
 
15 interviews have been conducted between 5th of June until 30th of November 2017. 
The duration of the interviews was 40 minutes in average; the longest ones were 1.5 
hours. Out of all interviews, 3 were conducted in English, 6 in Romanian and 6 in 
Russian language. Most of the interviews were conducted in person – in Chisinau, and 
the rest by skype, 2 were submitted in written form. Some interviewees requested 
anonymity, due to the nature of institution they work for. The composition of the 
interviewees is as follows: 
 																																																								
106 Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. "Conducting and coding elite interviews." Political Science 
& Politics 35.04 (2002): 673-676. 
107 Berry, Jeffrey M. "Validity and reliability issues in elite interviewing." Political Science & 
Politics 35.04 (2002): 679-682. 	
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The selection of interviewees was based on their expertise and knowledge of the case 
study country, due to the complexity of the topic. There have been sent 10 interview 
requests in English, 20 in Russian and 10 in Romanian with a cover letter and interview 
questions. Eight interviews have been held personally by the author, five by Skype and 
two were filled in personally by the respondents. The interviews have been recorded, 
with the agreement from interviewees. Three interviewees requested anonymity, due to 
their employment contract requirements. The translations of the interview questions 
have been performed in case the interview was performed in languages other than 
English that is in Romanian and Russian. The findings of the interviews were later 
translated into English.  
 
The respondents of the interviews were as follows: 
 
1) EU Foreign Action Service Official, directly involved in the Confidence 
Building Measures provided for Transnistria, starting with 2009 until 
September 2017. 
 
2) EU diplomat, involved with the Transnistrian settlement issue. 
 
3) International expert, involved with confidence building measures in 
Transnistria.  
 
4) Artem Filipenko, International expert and researcher, specialized in the 
Transnistrian issue, Director of the “Context-Prichernomorye” Black Sea 
Coast Information Agency, Odessa, Ukraine.  
 
5) Oazu Nantoi, Moldovan national expert. Political analyst and researcher on 
Moldova/Transnistria, specialized in international relations. Currently, 
member of the Institute for Public Policy think-tank.  
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6) Denis Cenusa, expert at Moldovan think-tank “Expert-Group”. Political 
scientist, his research interests include EU affairs and European integration, 
ENP and Eurasian integration initiatives.  
 
7) Ion Manole, expert, executive director of “Promo-Lex” Association, a 
human rights and advocacy organization, a leading organization which 
cooperates with Transnistrian NGOs to protect human rights in the region. 
 
8) Iurie Morcotilo, economic expert at Moldovan think-tank “Expert-Group”, 
originated from Transnistria.  
 
9) Victor Dragutan, expert and analyst with experience in Moldova’s 
advancement in the Association Agreement, until July 2016 - Program 
Manager in the Confidence Building Measures Program, with the UNDP 
Moldova office.  
 
Transnistrian respondents: 
 
10) Anatoly Dirun – Director of the School for Political Research and political 
scientist from Tiraspol, Transnistria. 
 
11)  Evghenii Dunaev – Chairman of the Informational legal center “Apriori”,  
legal consultancy, developing of civil society from Tiraspol, Transnistria.  
 
12) Raisa Asauleac – Program coordination of “NGO Resource Center and 
Initiative Groups for Transnistria”.  
 
13) Vitaliy Rotar – Director of “Institute for Law and Civil Society” NGO from 
Transnistria. The Institute is working on the grassroots and middle social 
leadership levels, offering support to public leaders, youth and NGOs, in the 
understanding and participation in the European integration process. 
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14) Andrey Nikolaev- Director of “Radoliubets” NGO – Association of 
Bulgarian culture, active with social projects and human rights initiatives in 
Transnistria.  
 
15) Luiza Doroshenko – Director of “Media Center”, a journalist center from 
Tiraspol, Transnistria.   
 
The interviewee method was used to cover the gaps, the grey areas that appeared due to 
the lack of access to information in the secondary sources. The reason why political and 
social decision-makers were chosen as interviewees is that they work as the 
“gatekeepers” when it comes to norm diffusion, especially in a society like Transnistria. 
Due to the experience of the respondents, their views were presented in a rather 
balanced manner. Still, perception has a subjective nature and can be debated. The 
interviewer’s task was to be as neutral as possible, and abstain from personal views. The 
thesis is taking into account the value of perception as an indicator.  
 
The questions of the interview were slightly modified when performing interviews with 
Transnistrian NGOs or experts, so that the focus was placed on their perspective of the 
situation. The questions of the interview suppose that the respondents are aware of the 
situation and the concepts used that is why the experts have been chosen as 
interviewees. Also, based on the fact that the interview was semi-structured, not all 
questions were answered by all the interviewees, still the advantage of an interview 
technique like that is the fact that the respondent could be open about questions, and to 
give additional overviews on various subjects.  
 
An objective justification for the usage of the interview method is that in this case it is 
practically impossible to analyze the norm diffusion by using other methods, due to the 
lack of access to authentic sources of documentation. Using the elite’s expertise for the 
interview gives an invaluable resource of information, since they are the ones who have 
a deeper understanding of the processes that take place in Transnistria. The interview 
questionnaire is aimed to reflect the opinion of experts involved in the field of 
normative power diffusion in Transnistria, on the basis of specialty literature. The 
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questionnaire offers empirical perspective for analyzing the diffusion process of 
normative power that is by consulting the opinion of experts concerning the relation 
with the EU in case of Transnistria. Theoretically, the questionnaire has the goal to 
avoid the prejudice towards the „imminent success” of the normative power diffusion. 
The theoretical framework, which was developed for the drafting of the questionnaire, 
is developed for the empirical exploration of cases of success and failures of normative 
power diffusion in the case of Transnistria.  
 
Another aspect tackled by the questionnaire refers to normative power diffusion as an 
element of Europeanization and reconstruction of Transnistrian identity. Although, this 
fact will be difficult to clarify, the intention is to describe the vision and the perception 
on normative power at the local level in Transnistria, under the aspect of diffusion and 
assumption of Europeanization at the border between the East and the West. The 
answers of experts, who are directly involved in the process of normative power 
diffusion, will be analyzed on the true position, whether it is rejection and the resistance 
towards the normative power Europe by Transnistria, or acceptance and internalization 
of the related norms and values. This aspect will be defining and verifying the 
hypothesis of normative power success as a principle of action, in the case of 
Transnistria. Therefore, the normative power diffusion in the case of Transnistria refers 
especially to the norms, which were meant to create a common European space for this 
territory, and the differences of opinion resulting from the will to adopt or not to adopt 
the European norms in the various segments of the Transnistrian society. Using this 
approach adopted in the framework of the questionnaire, it is possible to critically 
assess the relation dictated by the diffusion of power between the EU – as a norm-maker 
and Transnistria – as the norm-taker.  
 
3.4. Research limitations  
The diffusion has several advanced mechanisms, and in the given case we will resume 
only to those relevant to the case of Transnistria. Thus, the EU as a norm-maker is 
oriented towards bringing normative changes in compliance with the normative 
standards and to recruit new perspective members. If on the one hand, “generalizations 
from single-country studies will always be limited, since the country unit itself is bound 
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by particular characteristics, while the potential for comparing variation in political 
phenomena across units is bound by time and space”108. On the other hand, the single 
case studies can play a critical role in comparative politics, by the fact that “they can be 
used to provide new classifications for observed political phenomena; generate and 
probe hypotheses that can be tested in different countries109, etc. The limitations of the 
single case studies, contrast with the benefits they produce.  
 
Among the limitations of the method is the responsiveness of the interviewees and the 
accessibility of the data. Unfortunately there was a low rate of responsiveness, and the 
findings are based on the interviewees who were eager to contribute. The Transnistrian 
authorities were contacted as well – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria, and 
a few Members of Parliament, however, without any response. Many of the 
Transnistrian NGOs that have been contacted did not reply, as well as academics from 
that region. The NGOs from Transnistria who were eager to participate were all active 
partners of the OSCE Mission in Moldova, actively participating in the process of 
building confidence between the two banks. 
The fact that there is a mixed sample of respondents helps to counter possible biases, 
which might result from personal opinions of the respondents. Also, the respondents 
have been quite critical of the processes and their concerns have been written down and 
reflected in the research. Concerning the evaluation of the influence of the normative 
power Europe, some outcomes are not final and will continue to bring results. It is 
necessary to further research the interaction of state with civil society to provide a 
broader picture. 																																																																
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4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU-MOLDOVA RELATIONSHIP 
 
The EU involvement in the Transnistrian issue has been increasing gradually. During 
the last 12 years, EU in Transnistria has transformed its role from being a low 
importance influencer to becoming one the main international actors producing change 
in the Transnistrian issue and in Moldova in general. The Transnistrian issue has 
become an important part of the EU-Russian agenda as well and an issue of dispute, and 
was described as “the new frontline” in the strained relationship between the EU and 
Russia110. It is important for the EU to support the stability of Moldova, which became 
its neighbor after Romania joined the EU in 2007. The enlargement has stimulated the 
EU to help Moldova address its internal problems: including a weak Government, 
economic difficulties, organized crime, emigration, and the secession of Transnistria. 
The fact that Moldova was going to become a new neighbor of the EU has drawn its 
attention to the internal problems Moldova was facing, including the issue of 
Transnistria and the stalemate in the negotiation process. As a result, the EU had 
adopted a number of actions to address that issue. One of them was the appointment of 
the EU Special Representative to Moldova, who started his duties in 2005, and whose 
task was to ensure the coordination and consistency of external actions of the EU in 
Moldova111. The mandate of the EUSR included the EU contribution to the resolution of 
the Transnistrian conflict in accordance with the agreed EU policy objectives and in 
close coordination with the OSCE.112 The EU Delegation was opened in Moldova in 
October 2005. At that period of time, Transnistria was still opposing Western 
involvement and was distrustful towards Europe.  
 
The EU has involved instruments to support the settlement of the conflict, one of these 
is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European Security Strategy 
pointed out that “it is in the European interest that countries on the EU’s borders are 
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well-governed113. The EU is promoting the reforms in the EU neighborhood by means 
of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). Also, in 2005 the EU launched the EU Border Assistance Mission to 
Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and it represents the first EU involvement on the 
ground in conflict resolution in former USSR space and it is a EU Commission-led 
Mission. This came after the joint request forwarded by Presidents of Moldova and 
Ukraine, in 2005, inviting the EU to contribute to border monitoring. EUBAM 
contributes towards the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through the 
negotiation mechanism 5+2 process and its related expert working groups114. Also, the 
EUBAM participates in the confidence-building measures between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol on transport, customs, veterinary and phytosanitary and law enforcement 
issues115. It also contributes to improved border management in a conflict area as well 
as undermining the smuggling and other criminal activities on the border, since the 
Mission monitors the trade directed from Transnistria to Ukraine.  
 
The EUBAM is also assisting in the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement - DCFTA, while interacting with Customs Services both in 
Moldova and in Ukraine and has advised both countries on their application116. The 
latest EUBAM activity report, for 2016 states the contributions that the Mission has 
provided, including the changes that the Transnistrian authorities have undertaken. In 
terms of confidence-building measures, EUBAM has supported the peaceful settlement 
to the Transnistrian conflict. During first years of activity of EU in Moldova, the 
EUBAM did not visit the left bank and the monitoring was performed along the 
Moldova-Ukrainian border either on the Moldovan side or on the Ukrainian one. This 
situation changed while Transnistria changed its approach and started to allow the visits 
of EUBAM and to participate in their joint activities. Also, EUBAM has organized joint 
study visits of customs experts from Chisinau and Tiraspol to their German 
																																																								
113 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
114 EUBAM official website, http://eubam.org/what-we-do/conflict-resolution/ accessed (20.12.2017). 
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116 EUBAM official website, http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Report_2016_ENG.pdf 
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counterparts117, the first event took place in 2013, where they learned about EU 
standards in joint customs control, with a view to enhance and harmonize customs 
procedures on both sides of Nistru river. This was the first customs initiative for 
Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
 
The main breakthrough in the confidence building process was to engage both parties 
on joint workshops and study visits, resulting in closer alignment of its regulations with 
EU requirements. One of those events took place in November 2016, when the EUBAM 
Mission organized a joint workshop on plant health import controls for Chisinau and 
Tiraspol phytosanitary and customs specialists. This was the second time in EUBAM’s 
history that it succeeded in bringing both sides together to share their experience118. 
 
Another EUBAM achievement was to contribute to the revitalizing of the trans-
boundary rail link between Chisinau and Odessa through Transnistria, which was 
reactivated in 2010 after a four-year stall119. This fact was perceived as a positive step in 
people to people contacts and to the cooperation between the two banks of the Nistru 
River. In terms of phytosanitary cooperation: the most significant progress in 
confidence building measures in 2016 was registered in developing cooperation on 
veterinary, sanitary and phytosanitary issues. An assessment of controls has been 
performed by EUBAM experts and presented to Transnistrian Foreign Office in 
Tiraspol. As a result, Transnistria has suspended the obligation for phytosanitary 
certification of relevant exports, in line with EUBAM’s recommendations120. Currently, 
the mandate of the Mission was extended until 2020, upon the request of the Republic 
of Moldova and Ukraine.  
 
Through the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU works with the Eastern neighbors, 
including Moldova. It was launched with the attempt to create “a ring of countries, 
sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close 																																																								
117 EUBAM official website, http://eubam.org/newsroom/transnistrian-party-joins-eubam-study-visit-to-
german-swiss-border/ (accessed 02.01.2018). 
118 Ibid 
119 EUBAM official website, http://eubam.org/what-we-do/conflict-resolution/ (accessed 15.12.2017). 
120 EUBAM Annual Report, http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Report_2016_ENG.pdf 
(accessed 03.01.2018). 
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relationship… This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased 
stability, security and well being”121. The ENP represents the extension of the EU 
norms, standards to the countries outside of the EU. There are four main domains that 
take part of this policy122: 
1) Good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights; 
2) Economic development for stabilization; 
3) Security and; 
4) Migration and mobility.   
 
The ENP Policy provides the support for the institutional building, to trade 
liberalization, legislative harmonization and it also contributes to the conflict resolution 
in the neighborhood. These aims are achieved by means of Action Plans (AP) between 
the EU and neighboring countries, with Moldova this AP was approved in 2005. 
Among the priorities, enumerated in the EU-Moldova Action Plan, is the sustained 
effort towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict123. The ENP instrument was 
modeled on the enlargement process, being similar to the Association Agreement 
structure124. The EU efforts and assistance depends to a great extend on the willingness 
and commitment of the conflicting parties to discuss the issues with the EU.  
 
The ENP was upgraded at the 2009 Prague Summit to a new approach – Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), which is focused on a deep bilateral and multilateral cooperation of 
EU with six states, including Moldova, and with two other regional projects – Black Sea 
Synergy and the Northern Dimension. The EaP is supplementing the ENP and enables 
political and economic integration, without a promise of enlargement. Although a 
questions appears on how effective the EU norm diffusion is in its near abroad without 
a clear promise of enlargement in the case of Moldova and Transnistria, this questions 																																																								
121 Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 
373 Final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, p. 5,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/com/com_com(2004)0373_/com_com(2
004)0373_en.pdf (accessed 20.10.2017). 
122 European Union External Action webpage, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en (accessed 20.10.2017). 
123 European Commission website,  https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf  
(accessed 20.05.2017). 
124 Kelley, Judith. "New wine in old wineskins: Promoting political reforms through the new European 
Neighbourhood Policy." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44.1 (2006): 29-55. 
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has been addressed by the new model of democracy promotion which rests on the 
functional cooperation between administrations, and that it bears greater potential 
beyond the circle of candidate countries. Even though the governance approach does not 
tackle the core institutions of the political system, and is not a substitute for the EU 
leverage, it does promote transparency, accountability and participation at the level of 
the state administration125.  
 
This program is coordinated via its Directorate-General for Neighborhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations. Based on this new program, a deeper political and economic 
integration with the EU is pursued. As a result, in 2013, the Republic of Moldova has 
initialed the Association Agreement with the EU at the EaP Summit in Vilnius. Also, 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements have been concluded. Along the 
most important areas of bilateral cooperation was visa facilitation and liberalization, and 
Moldovans gained the visa-free right to travel to the EU in 2014.  
 
The core components of the EaP are the Association Agreements (AA), the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) and the visa liberalization 
agreement126. Moldova and the EU have been negotiating an AA since 2010 and the 
DCFTA since 2012, whereas a bilateral visa dialogue was initiated as part of the EaP127. 
As of 1 January 2016, after repeal of the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences regime, 
Transnistrian exports continued to benefit from preferential treatment in the EU, since 
the scope of the DCFTA application extended to the entire territory of the Republic of 
Moldova pursuant to Decision 1/2015 of the EU-Republic of Moldova Association 
Council 128 . Initially, the Transnistrian authorities did not show any interest in 
implementing the reforms necessary for the DCFTA129. Transnistria was benefitting 																																																								
125 Börzel, Tanja A., and Bidzina Lebanidze. "“The transformative power of Europe” beyond 
enlargement: the EU’s performance in promoting democracy in its neighbourhood." East European 
Politics 33.1 (2017): 17-35. 
126 Rinnert, David. "The Republic of Moldova in the Eastern partnership." From “Poster Child” to 
“Problem” (2013). 
127European Union External Action website, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/4011/EUMoldova%20relations,%20Factsh
eet (accessed 02.03.2017). 
128 EUBAM Annual Report, 2016, http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Report_2016_ENG.pdf 
(accessed 04.01.2018). 
129 Rinnert, David. "The Republic of Moldova in the Eastern partnership." From “Poster Child” to 
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from the Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), which were later suspended after the 
ratification of the DCFTA and Transnistria had to implement reforms necessary for the 
DCFTA with Brussels. The Normative Power Europe agenda in Moldova and 
Transnistria has been promoted with small steps, starting with economic incentives 
whose effects will be analyzed in the following chapter below. 
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5.  ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis of Normative Power Europe and its effect on the case study country – 
Transnistria will be provided in the present and next chapter. A short background on 
economic situation will be provided, followed by an analysis of the political situation, 
to show where the effects of the EU normative power are more successful, followed by 
examples and findings.  
 
5.1 Background and economic situation 
The object of study in international relations is focused mostly on large and powerful 
states, whereas partially recognized or unrecognized states are more challenging to 
analyze. The status of such states makes it more difficult to monitor the developments 
that take place inside. Lack of transparency, no participation within international forums 
and organizations, together with influences from patron states, which want to keep these 
unrecognized states within their sphere of interest, do add to the complexity. Some of 
these entities have appeared following the collapse of the Soviet Union (South Ossetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Transnistria). Despite these limitations, it is 
important to continue the research of such entities since they exist outside of 
international framework and represent a threat to regional and international security. 
What is more, despite general expectations, they have proven to be quite durable, and 
considering the current geopolitical climate, are unlikely to disappear soon. Dov Lynch 
concludes that these de facto entities are “racketeer states,” that is, entities that provoke 
and/or are a threat from the state they seek to break away from, and then, at a price, 
protect the population from the same threat130. It is therefore imperative to study these 
entities in report with the outside world and in this case with the EU and its normative 
power. 
 
Since 1991 Transnistria emerged on the path of state building, it has managed to create 
and establish its own state-like structures, even their own army, supported greatly by the 
Russian troops stationed on the territory of Transnistria since the 1992 war. These are 
the so-called peacekeepers, 402 in number. Besides, Russia holds the Operative Group 																																																								
130 Lynch, Dov, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States. Unresolved Conflicts and De facto States. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. 
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of the Russian Forces, the legal successor of the 14th Army, containing approximately 
1200 regular soldiers, mainly recruited from Transnistrian locals 131 . Despite the 
numerous times when Moldova demanded Russia to withdraw its troops from the 
territory of Transnistria, Russia has refrained from doing so, even if it pledged to 
withdraw the troops by 2002, in 1999, at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999.  
 
Although the conflict has been described as “frozen”, it has been argued that the so-
called de facto states conflicts are not “frozen”, but are dynamic and smoldering rather 
than frozen132. Transnistria is cooperating with external partners, and is becoming more 
open for cooperation. Transnistria as a small, unrecognized state cannot survive without 
help from abroad. Faced with financial constraints and limited resources, vulnerabilities 
in front of external developments, Transnistria has to find an approach to compensate 
for these deficiencies, by means of aligning with outside partners, the main ones being 
the EU and Russia, which are in contradiction. The main partner and supporter of 
Transnistria, Russia, has been described as playing the role of the patron in this 
relationship of patron-client133. This model consists of reciprocity in the patron and 
client relationship and exchange of benefits, which the parties could deliver to each 
other. In order to survive as a state, Transnistria has to adapt to the changes in the 
international field and to apply certain strategies.  
 
In terms of behavior of the EU towards the issue of Transnistria, it has been described 
as “soft balancing”134, which is characterized by the usage of non-military methods of 
limiting Russia’s ability to exercise power. The “soft balancing” approach has produced 
a “paper wall” in the conflict, or a barrier against Russian dominance. The EU has used 
this strategy, in order to promote the stability in the region, as well as to maintain good 
relations with Russia.  																																																								
131 Moldova.Org Independent Information Portal, http://www.moldova.org/en/russian-troops-illegally-
stationing-transnistria-held-military-exercise-nistru-river/ (accessed 27.12.2017). 
132 Kolossov, Vladimir. "A Small State vs a Self-Proclaimed Republic: Nation-Building, Territorial 
Identities and Prospects of Conflict Resolution (the Case of Moldova-Transdniestria)." From the Adriatic 
to the Caucasus (2001): 1000-1028. 
133 Andrey Devyatkov, “Russia and Transnistria in a patron-client relationship”, Laboratorul pentru 
Analiza Conflictului Transnistrean, retrieved from: http://www.lact.ro/2017/04/17/andrey-devyatkov-
russia-and-transnistria-in-a-patron-client-relationship 
134 Cantir, Cristian, and Ryan Kennedy. "Balancing on the Shoulders of Giants: Moldova's Foreign Policy 
toward Russia and the European Union." Foreign Policy Analysis 11.4 (2015): 397-416. 
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This effort in building a separate state is also reflected in measures taken to form a 
distinct Transnistrian identity, different from that of the Republic of Moldova that they 
separated from. Being isolated from the outer world due to restrictions imposed by the 
unrecognized status, does help in creating a separate identity, and in perceiving 
Moldova as “the other”. These efforts have worked despite similar ethnic composition 
on both banks, as shown in the statistical data. The population of Transnistria accounts 
for 475 000 citizens, or 14% of the overall population of the Republic of Moldova135. It 
is composed of three main ethnic groups, as well as minorities136. 
 
A similar ethnical composition is in the Republic of Moldova, though with a far higher 
percentage of Romanians/Moldovans and with one more ethnic group of Gagauz 
(Turkic origin of orthodox religion, residing in the south of the Republic of Moldova). 
The latest census of the population from 2014 showed the following figures: 
 
Table 1. Ethnic composition  
 
Transnistria Republic of Moldova 
• 32.1% Moldovans 
• 30.4% Russians 
• 28.8% Ukrainians 
• 2.5% Bulgarians 
• 6.2% others / unspecified 
 
• 75% Moldovans + 7% Romanians  
• 7% Russians 
• 6.6% Ukrainians 
• 4.6% Gagauz 
• 1.9% Bulgarians 
• 0.8 others 
 
Sources:  www.statistica.md137 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new generations have been born who believe in 
their state and future independence. The Constitution of Transnistria, first adopted in 
1991, provides for a semi-presidential political system, however the balance of power 
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was gradually shifted towards the presidency138. The further amendments in the 
Constitution were attempts to strengthen the presidential power.  
 
Lately, Transnistria has applied to the UN with a request for the status of observer, in 
order to push forward the process of its international recognition: “This fact will give a 
chance to bring forward our position to the international actors directly, without 
interpretation from the opposing party”139. Tiraspol wants to be heard by EU without 
the help of intermediaries and have a direct dialogue: “If the EU will remove their 
intermediaries from Chisinau, I am more than sure that the role of the EU will be better 
understood in Tiraspol… no matter how the EU sees us: as an uncontrolled territory, or 
as partially controlled territory140”. In an interview held by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Transnistria with the mass-media, he mentioned that Transnistria is not sitting 
still, they are developing the bilateral relations (with Moldova), and they are 
cooperating with international organizations: “It is our decision, after all if we want to 
exist as a state or not and in case if Chisinau recognizes Transnistria as an independent 
state, who could be against that?141”. In an interview conducted by the author of this 
thesis, it was emphasized: “We believe that the fact that Transnistria exists for 26 years 
is a proof in itself that we are a viable and independent state”142.  
 
As declared by Transnistria since 2006, the direction of the country is unification with 
the Russian Federation143. Despite the fact that Moscow has not changed their official 
view on the status of Transnistria and still supports the territorial indivisibility of the 
Republic of Moldova, Russia continues to provide support to this entity, including 
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financial. NGOs initiated by Moscow have implemented projects on infrastructure144. 
According to sources, Russia has issued 160 thousand passports to Transnistrian 
residents, which guaranteed social benefits, out of them the pensions145. It is important 
to mention that these pensions are not flowing to the national budget, but are received 
by the Russian citizens residing on the territory of Transnistria. Russia has also 
contributed to Transnistria by means of subsidies for gas imports. Transnistria received 
Russian gas even if they did not pay for it. This has led to an accumulation of debt that 
is considered to be over 5 bln USD146. This fact has favored people’s general support to 
the authorities. These actions on behalf of the Russian Federation indicate that 
Transnistria serves as a leverage instrument to promote their policy in the Republic of 
Moldova and to keep this country within their ring of the near-abroad states, rather than 
the desire to recognize Transnistria as a separate entity.  
 
The results of surveys and experts’ reports are not optimistic. According to the Freedom 
House Report from 2016, Transnistria is not considered to be a free country, with an 
aggregate score of 24 out of 100; ranking in civil liberties: 14 out of 60, rule of law: 2 
out of 16147. The influence of the internal groups of oligarchs who retain most of the 
power within the state, the lack of political will from the Republic of Moldova, as well 
as the difficulty for the EU and international actors to cause dramatic changes by means 
of negotiations, these all factors are hampering Transnistria to make vivid 
improvements in democratization.  
 
Chisinau took a number of measures to re-gain the control over the region, and one of 
these actions was the initiative to introduce new customs stamps in Transnistria. In 
2001, Moldova introduced new customs stamps to be used for export operations, this 
fact has limited the foreign trade activity of Tiraspol148. In fact the effect was to limit 
the uncontrolled trade activity, whereas in terms of overall trade activity this measure 
has been beneficial to the PMR since they gained the direct access to the EU markets, 																																																								
144 Istomin, Igor, and Irina Bolgova. "Transnistrian strategy in the context of Russian–Ukrainian relations: 
the rise and failure of ‘dual alignment’." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies16.1 (2016): 169-194. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Freedom House Country Report on Transnistria, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2016/transnistria (accessed 10.07.2017). 
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which other post-Soviet de facto states cannot benefit from. Another action was to apply 
control on the common frontier with the help for the international mission EUBAM, in 
order to limit illegal trade operations149. Although Transnistria and Russia denounced 
these actions, and considered them acts of economic pressure, both the Moldovan as 
well as the EU authorities consider them as actions to strengthen Moldova’s control on 
their Eastern border. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova 
reacted to these actions and claimed that these are “absolutely unfounded critiques, 
meant to confuse the public opinion and provoke new tensions150”. Another example 
when actions undertaken by Moldovan authorities were blamed was the initiative to 
start the joint control of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. This action has been labeled as 
Moldovan “economic blockade” with the support of Ukraine by Transnistria, although 
in the eyes of the rest of the world this initiative was saluted as a way to stop the 
smuggling across the border and to diminish corruption.  
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Figure 2. Map of Moldova and Ukraine  
 
Source: www.euromaidanpress.com151 
 
The fact that Moldova does not have control over its border with Ukraine along the 454 
km, which is controlled by Transnistria, has raised numerous problems like smuggling, 
uncontrolled migration. The negotiations to open joint Moldovan-Ukrainian border 
crossing posts were held for many years, and only in 2017 did both countries agree on a 
joint strategy. The first joint checkpoint has been opened on Ukrainian territory 
bordering Transnistria and 12 more will be opened in the future152. The first joint 																																																								
151 Yuri Zoria “Ukraine Helps Moldova Regain Control over Border in Transnistrian region”, Euromaidan 
Press Independent Newspaper, 21 July, 2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/07/21/ukraine-helps-
moldova-regain-control-over-border-in-transnistria-region/ (accessed 10.08.2017). 
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crossing point is in Kuchurhan-Pervomaisc in Odessa Oblast, which was labeled by the 
Russia’s Foreign ministry as “elements of external pressure” referring to the EU 
funding involved in the process153. This measure was important not only for the 
purposes of control over the territory. It is an important action, which, according to 
EUBAM is going to bring considerable benefits154, among which: the re-established 
international transport corridors across Transnistria; increased transparency by control 
of goods moving across Transnistria; allowing Ukrainian and Moldovan, including 
Transnistria economic operators to import/export goods, this way reducing time and 
cost that otherwise was used for double clearance and re-routing; and supporting the 
free movement of goods and people as one of the 5+2 process key principles. The head 
of the European Union delegation to Moldova, Pirkka Tapiola, mentioned after a 
meeting with representatives of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine (EUBAM) and that he could say with certainty that there was no blockade on 
Transnistria155.  
 
The economic situation in Transnistria has reached critical values of imbalance. 
Transnistria is struggling with severe economic crisis and one of the outcomes was a 
30% pay cut in the public sector and pensions in 2015-2016156. Also, the negative 
impact of external factors, and the status of unrecognized state affect the economy of 
Transnistria to a great extent. The economy started to deteriorate at the end of 2014 and 
the main factor was the fact that Russia offered less financial support, due to the 
situation in Ukraine (occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbas). The separatist 
government was only able to pay 70% of pensions and public sector wages in 2015 and 
poverty has escalated as a result157. The dependence on external markets and, more 
importantly, on foreign infrastructure, has made the TMR particularly vulnerable to 
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global economic conjuncture and the will of its neighbors to continue economic 
interactions158.  
 
A very explicit way to show the developments in Transnistrian economy along time, is 
to start with the collapse of the Soviet Union and observe the way the situation has 
changed until nowadays (see Tables 2 and 3), is to compare the economic developments 
on both banks of the Nistru river, that is in Transnistria and the rest of Moldova. 
According to the comparative study carried out by economists, the GDP on both banks 
of the Nistru River is of 7,6 billion USD, out of which on the right bank (Moldova) the 
GDP is of 6,6 billion or 86%, and on the left bank (Transnistria) – 1 billion USD or 
14% 159.  
 
During the collapse of the USSR the degree of industrialization on the left bank was 2.5 
times higher than on the right bank, but in present times there is the same share on both 
sides. In the 90s, after the fall of the USSR, Transnistria was left with several large 
industrial plants. Currently, these are in bad condition. The situation is worsened due to 
the fact that Moscow finds it more and more difficult to keep Transnistria “afloat”160 
due to increasing budgetary and economic pressure. This situation requires a strong 
injection of currency to save the Transnistrian ruble. The GDP fell by 22 % in 2015 
alone161. 
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Table 3. Economic indicators for Transnistria, comparative with Moldova: 
 1991 2016 
Population 0,55 mln. 
pers.  
about 0,4 mln. pers.  
Industrial Potential, out of total GDP of Moldova 40%  14%  
Agricultural Potential, percentage out of Moldova  30% 11%  
Banking System, out of Moldova 22%  12%  
Textile Industry, out of Moldova 43%  9%  
Food Industry, out of Moldova 40%  13%  
Foreign Trade 
98% towards 
former 
USSR  
 65% towards EU  
Source: IDIS- Viitorul162  
 
These tables demonstrate the extent of the degradation, taking place in Transnistria. The 
industrial and agricultural potential have diminished drastically. In order to exist as a 
sovereign state Transnistria lacks economic sustainability (currently the state budget is 
supported financially by various funds from the Russian Federation) and it needs 
recognition from other states. The budget revenues are not enough to cover the pensions 
and salaries of the public sector. The dramatic economic situation poses a direct threat 
to stability in the region and creates tensions in this unrecognized republic.  
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Table 4 
Economic indicators in 2016: 
 Left bank Right bank 
Population, thousand people 475 2.913 
GDP, billion USD  1,01 6,6 
Covering Expenditures with Revenue from the Consolidated 
Budget  
77%  94,8%  
Revenue from the Central Budget, thousand USD 134  1.447  
Central Budget Expenditures, thousand USD 246  1.621  
  Public Debt, thousand USD 1.260 2.560 
 Debt Per/capita, thousand USD 2.650  880  
 
Source: IDIS “Viitorul” Foundation163  
 
The situation with currency reserves in the Central Bank of Transnistria is catastrophic, 
according to experts. The total currency reserves of the entire Republic of Moldova, 
together with Transnistria constitute 2.345 million USD, out of which the right bank has 
2.333 or 99,5%, and the left bank has only 12,5 million USD – according to latest 
public data from March 2016, which constitutes only 0,5% of the total reserves of the 
Republic of Moldova. If reported to the number of the population, the currency reserves 
of the right bank per capita are 30 times higher and constitute 800 USD per capita, 
compared to 26 USD on the left bank164.  The same expert suggests that the lack of 
currency reserves on the left bank creates serious pressures on the Transnistrian 
currency and without a considerable monetary injection, the Transnistrian ruble risks a 
major depreciation. The situation is dramatic with regard to expenditures, covered by 
the state budget. The left bank relies on foreign help from the Russian Federation to 																																																								163	Ionita, Veaceslav . Premizele privind reintegrarea sistemelor economico-financiare de pe ambele 
maluri ale Nistrului. IDIS “Viitorul”, 2017	
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survive and cover their expenditures. The GDP on the left bank constitutes one billion 
USD, which accounts for 14% of the general GDP of the Republic of Moldova165.  
 
Russian financial assistance to Transnistria has diminished significantly due to the fall 
in the ruble exchange rate, as the rate of the Transnistrian ruble against the dollar (the 
main settlement currency) is maintained at a high level by the authorities of the 
unrecognized republic166. Additionally, the authorities have taken steps to alleviate the 
situation by devaluating the local currency. One first attempt was in June, 2017, when 
the currency was devaluated by 25%167. Since the economy is suffering and Russia 
delayed its support, the government proceeded to the next devaluation of the 
Transnistrian ruble from 15 to the US dollar to 15.5 to the US dollar in early November, 
2017168. Oazu Nantoi169, in an interview to the deschide.md news portal has declared 
that: “despite the sanctions, Russia avails of sufficient financial resources to maintain 
this regime. There is an impression that Russia does not want to finance this regime”170. 
The small internal market, taken together with the decreased demographic potential and 
a decreasing potential of the region results in the vulnerability of its economy and the 
impossibility to function without outside help.  
 
Transnistria has been labeled as “black hole” of Europe, and its political regime – to be 
dominated by corruption, lawlessness and money laundering. The fact that the territory 
lacks legal access to the world economy, does contribute to the emergence of the black 
market. The decades of the legal limbo have also brought their contribution. These 
conditions highlight the threat that prolonged conflicts bring and signal the fact that the 
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problem will not solve itself, but that special complex measures should be taken to 
tackle it. 
 
5.2. Political situation 
Between 1991 and 2011 the country was led by Igor Smirnov, who lost the elections in 
favor of Evghenii Shevciuk at the end of 2011. During the next election rounds, in 
2016, the winner was Vadim Krasnoselski – the President of the Supreme Soviet of 
Transnistria, who won by accumulating more than 62% of votes. The strongest political 
party, “Obnovleniye” (“Renewal”) which is the political arm of Sheriff, the largest 
company based in Transnistria, holds 33 out of 43 places in the National Assembly. 
According to the Rise Moldova portal of journalist investigation, the Sheriff 
conglomerate is the wealthiest and the most influential business group in Transnistria171. 
The companies within the Sheriff holding are active on all segments of the economy – 
from the food products, cars, fuels, medications, to production and exportation of 
alcohol, mobile and fixed telephony, furniture, internet, banks, insurance, hospitality, 
sports and mass-media. Many of the employees of the holding are deputies in the 
Supreme Soviet, on behalf of the Obnovlenie party, which has won the majority of seats 
in the Parliament.   
 
Added to the picture is the fact that Transnistrian businesses are not able to continue 
smuggling activities any longer, due to the EUBAM Mission presence as well as the 
actions of Ukraine and Moldova to control their borders and prevent smuggling. As a 
result, Transnistria recently started to export more to the European Union than to the 
Russian Federation. The statistics show that the volume of export from Transnistria to 
the EU has increased to reach the 65%. Meanwhile, the Transnistria export to the 
Russian Federation was worth only 7 million US dollars, almost twice less than in the 
same period of the last year172. 
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The declarations of Russian Federation with regard to the status of Transnistria are 
rather clear: they do not recognize its independence and support the indivisibility of the 
Republic of Moldova. However, Russia still keeps its presence on the territory of 
Transnistria and offers political protection to the Russian speaking population and 
maintains the current status-quo of Transnistria with providing continuous support. It is 
through Transnistria that Russia makes attempts to introduce the Republic of Moldova 
into its sphere of influence by trying to convince the latter to join the Eurasian 
Economic Union (where Moldova is currently an observer member).  
 
5.3. EU boosts change in Moldova and Transnistria 
Since Transnistria is an unrecognized state, the EU does not have any presence on its 
territory, which excludes the overt diffusion, making the assessment of EU impact a 
difficult task. Also, there is a lack of information about the developments that take place 
in Transnistria, and the actual sources of information are the experts. On the other hand, 
the EU institutions consider the Transnistrian issue as politically sensitive one; hence 
there is no openness in discussing these issues – as was stated in replies to the author’s 
requests for interviews or during the interviews themselves. Besides, there is a shortage 
of data on economic and social developments in Transnistria, provided by their local 
authorities. What is possible to perform is to study the EU actions and the reactions of 
Transnistrian authorities on the other hand.  
 
Concerning the perspective of Transnistria, it has declared its will to join the Russian 
Federation, as in 2006 there was a referendum on joining Russia, with 97% of votes cast 
in favor173. Since the Russian Federation, as mediator in the 5+2 negotiations process, is 
supporting the unified Moldova, Transnistria is continuously participating in the 
negotiations, showing their political pragmatism. While this has been the result of the 
referendum, a curious result was obtained in another survey conducted by CBS-AXA on 
both banks in 2009, aiming at investigating the opinions on joining the EU. The results 
obtained showed that the majority of the people on both sides of the river are in favor of 
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joining the EU (72% in Moldova and 63% in Transnistria) 174. Among other results, 
37.7 % of Transnistrians think that the biggest impediment to joining the EU is the lack 
of a settlement to the conflict175. Even though these are not recent surveys, such a high 
percentage attained is indicative of the potential for change that the EU has and the 
attractiveness of the EU in Transnistria.			
The EU has implemented its economic incentives in Transnistria, which have proven to 
be successful. The Preferential trade arrangements between Moldova and the EU are 
operating since 2005, also named the Generalized System of Preference Plus – GPS+. 
Due to the positive results coming out of this arrangement, the Transnistrian authorities 
continued the work to implement the conditions in order to further benefit from Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. In 2008, the EU has extended the 
autonomous trade preferences for Moldova and as a result, the trade statistics of 
Transnistria have been changed – with major exports going to the EU states, rather than 
to Russia. The Association Agreement including its Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area was designed to cover the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova, and 
that includes Transnistria. The Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs) represent a number of actions and instruments meant to 
boost the trade between EU and its partner countries. As a result, the trade with the EU 
between the whole of Moldova registered increasing trends since application. 
DCFTA is an obligatory condition in order for Transnistria to enjoy the freedom of 
export to the EU. There was a list with special engagements that was forwarded to 
Transnistria, named “measures to facilitate the access of Transnistrian enterprises to the 
EU market”176. A series of these measures have been agreed by the Transnistrian 
authorities. On December 18, 2015, it was decided by the AA – EU-Moldova 
Association Council – that the DCFTA should be implemented all over Moldova 
starting with January 1, 2016177. The difficult economic situation that Transnistria is 																																																								
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facing is stimulating its participation in the DCFTA. Gradually the political elites of 
Transnistria will have to apply the conditionalities imposed by the EU in the form of 
structural reforms, as influenced by the DCFTA.  
The DCFTA is an arrangement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova that 
foresees a preferential trade relationship, based on mutually advantageous treatment, 
giving to each other better access to their markets than that offered to other trade 
partners178. It foresees the removal of import duties and export as well, on trade goods. 
As a result, obstacles in trade are removed and the companies have a better access to the 
EU markets. 
  
The recent bank fraud scandal when 1 billion USD of state reserves have vanished from 
national banks in Moldova in 2014, involving prominent politicians, caused 
dissatisfaction with the pro-European Government and produced mass protests in 
Chisinau179. These events caused the disappointment of the EU in Moldova, as it used to 
be called a “success story” before. There are fears that the EU might abandon or lessen 
their support to Moldova due to this scandal. The fraud has left people in crucial point 
for change, which explains and has diminished the people’s support to pro-European 
parties. Before that Moldova was considered to be the “success story” of the European 
Neighborhood Policy, but this event has caused ascendance of pro-Russian politicians, 
like Igor Dodon who has won the presidential elections from October, 2016. The 
disappointment on behalf of the EU and of the population of Moldova in the Governing 
elites is understandable, however many reforms have been carried out in Moldova until 
this event took place. As mentioned by one interviewee: “Despite these disappointments 
I think that there are systemic changes that are irreversible and what I think the EU 
should not do is become disappointed too fast”180. The EU is an institution that moves 
slowly, hence: “If the EU starts moving out of Moldova, in a couple of years when the 
situation will be better, and it will be important to provide some of the support, it will 
not be so easy to shift its presence back”181.  																																																								
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In Transnistria, the EU presence is felt stronger, due to the economic benefits that the 
liberalized trade brings. Still, there is some reticence towards reflecting the EU support 
and efforts in the mass-media. A Transnistrian interviewee has mentioned that: “The EU 
support and activities are generally not very well reflected in our mass media”182. The 
impression is created that the Transnistrian regime is vigilantly controlling the activities 
of NGOs financed from abroad to prevent the development of a solid civil society, 
which might grow strong and cause change. With all that, the positive influence of the 
EU is acknowledged in Transnistria and the Transnistrian group of respondents have 
voiced that there is a general welcoming and acceptance of the EU assistance and 
support: “We do not see anything wrong in cooperating with EU, we can have a lot to 
learn from Europe and Europeans, there are many positive practices which can be 
implemented here as well”183. 
Transnistria already feels the economic advantages of cooperation with the EU, resulted 
from the implementation of the DCFTA and trade liberalization and the efficiency of 
the EU in this respect has been acknowledged by Transnistrian respondents: ““Out of 
the efficient activities, we can mention the economic interaction, which is positively 
influencing Transnistria. We can see tangible results due to the influence of the 
DCFTA”184. 
 
The Transnistrian authorities are taking a closer look on local NGOs since several 
human rights NGOs have been blocked by local authorities. The authorities have 
prepared a bill against “foreign agents” – aiming to prohibit the NGOs that are not 
agreed upon by the authorities. This initiative is copied from Russia, when in 2012 the 
Law on Foreign Agents was introduced, that required NGOs that are funded by foreign 
organizations, to register themselves as foreign agents185. This fact has been indicated 
by some NGOs aas a limitation to their activities: “The main problem in our activity is 
that a new concept is being introduced, with the help of Russian Federation – that of 																																																								
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foreign agents and there is a new draft law that is being reviewed now186”. One of the 
NGOs active in the field of human rights, located in Chisinau is Promo-Lex and they 
are being targeted by the Transnistrian authorities as well. They are blamed for 
“ideologically influencing” the people of Transnistria: “The Transnistrian KGB has 
created a lot of obstacles to us, while we were the first ones to open the door to the civil 
society in Transnistria, by organizing debates, summer schools, other activities”187. 
Unfortunately, the Promo-Lex NGO has not been allowed to enter Transnistria for the 
last two and a half years188.  
 
The Transnistrian respondents consider the example of Moldova as a positive one, 
despite the numerous problems that exist and would like to follow their lead: “What we 
see as the example of Moldova, is an improvement of the culture of civil society, its 
growth and development. The laws that are promoted are clearly in the front run of the 
society. From our side, we are even envious on the situation in Moldova, and we would 
like to see how it will unfold in the future and what the effects will be”189. In terms of 
EU support, the opinions are that there is a need for special programs tailor-made for 
Transnistria, by taking into account the situation in place: “The EU does not have a 
comprehensive strategy for the settlement of the conflict”190, and that the “EU does not 
have separate programs directed on the work with Transnistria”191. 
 
Still, Russia holds to its influence in the Republic of Moldova, through its channels and 
strong instruments. Russia is still the only provider of gas in Transnistria and it can still 
provoke some separatist attitudes not only in Transnistria, but also in Gagauzia and in 
other parts of Moldova. Russia plays hard against the EU power in Moldova and 
Transnistria. A paradoxical situation is with the gas delivery in Transnistria from 
Russian Gazprom. For more than 25 years Transnistria has not paid for their gas 
consumption. Instead, the debt is accumulated to the burden of the Republic of Moldova 
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– and has reached the amount close to 6 billion USD192. Besides, there is massive 
propaganda from Russia mass-media sources that is influencing the opinions of people 
in Transnistria: “The population lives in poverty, and hence it is easier being 
manipulated”193. People still have nostalgia for the Soviet past and this nostalgia is 
heavily exploited by the authorities: “In Transnistria,… the Soviet model of security 
offered a strong nostalgic contrast to the inadequacies of the existing system or the 
uncertainties and dislocations of Western-style democracy”194.  
 
The EU is one of the most active actors in the region and it sees the status of 
Transnistria within the reintegrated Republic of Moldova. The involvement of the EU in 
the promotion of human rights takes place, and there was voiced the need for the EU 
involvement in a mixed Committee for Human Rights: “When a person is put to jail on 
a fictitious case, then that person is helpless. So a mixed Committee on Human Rights, 
with the involvement of the EU can serve as a real instrument to help find a solution at 
the highest level.195”. The idea with the mixed committee was voiced during the 
interview, and have not encountered any papers or agreements to create it, although 
similar ideas have also been expressed by the interviewees from the Moldovan NGOs, 
like Promo-Lex, for example. EU’s contribution to the promotion of human rights is felt 
in the region and there are initiatives carried out in this respect: “Sufficient efforts are 
given in order to support the human rights of people in general and of separate groups 
of people – for example people with disabilities or for example national minorities”196. 
 
The EU favors the small steps policy in the interaction with its partners: “The EU 
institutions tend to apply small steps approach which applies a multitude of actions of 
low intensity, but unfortunately the EU is not able to react when the situation is 
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changing very quickly” 197 . The obstacle towards a more efficient change is the 
resistance to modernization coming from local authorities, both in Transnistria as well 
as in Moldova, according to experts: “This resistance to modernization is related to the 
fact that certain privileged groups of people want to keep these privileges and this is 
why they are obstructing the reforms”198. So what the EU is facing is not only the 
Russian influence, but also the reluctance of Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities to 
change the status quo.  
 
Among EU contributions is the fact that “The EU has been able to keep the dialogue 
between the sides going and avoid worsening to the security situation in the region”199. 
The key interests of the EU are to prevent the escalation of the Transnistrian conflict, 
control of migration and of the trafficking of human beings, which were declared 
primordial conditions according to the Association Agreement EU-Moldova. The EU 
influence is provided by long-term means through channels, such as: financial 
assistance, direct budgetary support, technical assistance, foreign investment, support in 
the Transnistrian settlement process and the securitization of the borders with the help 
of the EUBAM Mission.  
 
 The joint border crossing in Pervomaysk-Kuciurgan is a major step forward in putting 
an end to smuggling activities. Border delimitation, which did not take place during 
many years, is already happening has been another step forward. According to the 
Ukrainian expert, “Ukraine does not approve the Russian scenario. Since 2014 the 
actions of Ukraine have been directed towards neutralization of potential threats, 
including military ones, coming from Transnistria. The agreement to install joint 
border-crossing posts is a logical step directed towards pushing Transnistria towards the 
Moldovan legal field.200” 
The advancement of the EU normative power in Moldova and Transnistria has 
benefitted the support coming from Ukraine as it has been playing more influence in the 																																																								
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region. The escalation of conflict in the Eastern Ukraine and certain activities in Odessa 
has caused Ukraine to pay more attention to the Transnistrian conflict as well and to be 
more interested in providing its support to the Transnistrian settlement process. As a 
consequence there have been measures undertaken by Ukraine, since the threat has 
influenced the Ukraine to move forward the cooperation with Moldova and to secure 
their borders by closing their territory for the transit of Russian military to-and-from 
Transnistria, as an impact of the Russian troops being dislocated in Transnistria. 
“Ukrainian authorities consider that the Russian troops dislocated on the territory of 
Moldova present a threat to Ukraine, and this fact is written down in the Military 
Doctrine of Ukraine”201. Besides, many experts in Ukraine consider that the conflicts in 
Transnistria and east of Ukraine are interconnected: “The key strategic goal of Russia is 
to include the regions – for example for Ukraine to accept Donbas, and for Moldova to 
accept Transnistria – based on the conditions that are convenient to Russia. The idea of 
transformation was the rights of these secessionist regions to block the political 
decisions taken at the central level. That is, to block the movement of Moldova or of 
Ukraine towards the EU”202. 
 
The majority of the Moldova experts still consider that the besides the geopolitical 
factor, the internal weakness and lack of will of Moldova to deal with the secessionist 
problem is the main cause of the problem. The opinion of Oazu Nantoi, a Moldovan 
national expert, who deals with the Transnistrian issue is that the Chisinau authorities 
are only pretending to be preoccupied in the Transnistrian conflict: and did not do 
enough to solve it: “This conflict is not solved yet not because Russia is so fierce, but 
because the authorities from Chisinau are corrupt, incompetent, and besides are 
involved in illegal smuggling schemes with implication of Transnistria”203. This opinion 
is also shared by some scholars as well. When speaking about the de facto states, Lynch 
mentioned that: “Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan have not become magnets 
sufficiently attractive to induce the separatist areas to compromise in order to benefit 
from the restoration of political and economic relations”204.  																																																								
201 Interview by the author with Artem Filipenko, political expert, Ukraine  
202 Interview by the author with Artem Filipenko, Ukrainian expert  
203 Interview by the author with Oazu Nantoi, expert in IPP think tank.  
204 Lynch, Dov. "Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts." The Legacy of the Soviet Union. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2004. 61-82. 
	 72 
 
The Transnistrian respondents, while accepting the attractive model of the EU and 
having acknowledged that the aim of the EU in Transnistria is to spread the EU norms 
of democracy, human rights and rule of law, they do not actually support the final aim 
of the EU aim to support re-integration of Transnistria as part of Moldova. Most of the 
Transnistrian respondents consider this goal unattainable since Transnistria is striving 
towards joining Russia. While the EU is recognized by Transnistria as a regional and 
international power, and is welcomed as a partner for development, cooperation with 
Russia on major issues is sought necessary for further development and peaceful 
conflict resolution. The EU power has been acknowledged and requests for help 
addressed to the EU institutions have been voiced, in terms of addressing deficiencies of 
some norms, like the human rights advancement. The Moldovan path of development is 
followed closely and positive advancements are taken into consideration, as part of the 
confidence-building program.   																											
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6. DIFFUSION OF EU NORMS IN TRANSNISTRIA  
The chapter of diffusion of norms will describe main instruments the EU uses in order 
to promote its support and influence. It is followed by a description of diffusion 
mechanisms of the normative power Europe, and the findings that have been identified 
per each of these mechanisms in Transnistria. Due to the fact that the EU channels their 
support towards Moldova, including Transnistria, it is challenging to divide this support 
and identify a single strand, which is dedicated to Transnistria only. Also, the nature of 
the EU, being composed of 27 member states, with overlapping institutions and 
initiatives – like the OSCE, produce results that are visible and sometimes cannot be 
singled out as only being the result of one effort.  
The EU is building asymmetrical relations with its partners, in order to provide for 
internal changes in those countries. These changes are not produced due to coercion or 
application of force, but through the power of attraction and the changes take time to be 
visible. Europe was described as a transformative power, one which is “broad and deep: 
once sucked into its sphere, countries are changed forever…Europe does not change 
countries by threatening to invade them: its biggest threat is to cut off contact with 
them205”. Normative power is particularly efficient in case when a country has a long-
term perspective and a will for subsequently joining the EU. In case of a EU candidate 
country, there are the Copenhagen criteria that serve as conditions to join. However, at 
this stage further enlargement is not under consideration, as Europe has reached its 
limits. The Copenhagen criteria, which are compulsory for a candidate and are strong 
incentives for structural change, cannot be applied in the case of Moldova and 
Transnistria. 
The instruments the EU can use as alternatives for enlargement, to further advance its 
influence in the neighboring countries are the European Neighborhood and Eastern 
Partnership (EaP). As previously written, the EU with its Southern and Eastern 
Neighbors to foster stabilization, security and prosperity through its ENP Policy and 
EaP initiative.  
The NPE outlines three core norms, which include: democracy, rule of law and human 																																																								
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rights206. Manners has also identified additional four norms have been identified:  social 
solidarity; anti-discrimination; sustainable development and good governance207. In this 
chapter, these core norms have been applied and analyzed in the framework of the EU 
policies and conditionalities undertaken in Transnistria and the way the actions taken by 
the EU towards Transnistria have contributed to the promotion of these norms. The 
actions taken by Transnistria as a result of these actions will be evaluated through the 
prism of advancing these norms.  Further, the diffusion of these norms has been traced 
down to actions performed by EU. This chapter is going to examine the normative 
influence of the EU on Transnistria by means of the six mechanisms of norm diffusion, 
as identified by Ian Manners, and the findings are going to be analyzed. The chapter is 
going to analyze the diffusion mechanisms from both the side of the EU – in order to 
describe whether the EU could be more active in promotion these mechanisms. From 
the point of view of Transnistria, it is important to show their reaction to EU policies 
and initiatives as evidence to the diffusion of EU norms.  
The mechanisms that are being used to diffuse the norms in Transnistria are examined 
in terms of strength and capacity. It is important to mention that the fact of measuring 
the impact of the EU on Transnistria is facing a number of difficulties due to the lack of 
a direct instrument of assistance programme. All forms of assistance given by the EU to 
Transnistria are a part of the overall package of policies and assistance provided to the 
Republic of Moldova in general. Other difficulties faced are the lack of information, the 
reluctance of the Transnistrian authorities to share data and the fact that the EU regards 
the Transnistrian issues as “politically sensitive”.  
The six mechanisms of diffusion, as identified my Manners are208:  
1. Contagion or unintentional diffusion of ideas. 
2. Information diffusion. 
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Studies 40(2): 235–58	
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3. Procedural diffusion: Institutionalization of a relationship of the EU and a third 
partner.  
4. Transference: Exchange of goods, aid, and technical assistance. 
5. Overt diffusion: Represents the physical presence of the EU in third states.  
6. Cultural filter: referring to learning and changing social and political identities.  
A significant aspect in these mechanisms is the absence of physical force in the 
imposition of norms. This absence of physical force and the importance of cultural 
diffusion lead to the argument that “the most important factor shaping the international 
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”209.  
 
1. Contagion  
This is a more passive manner of diffusion. With Transnistria being an unrecognized 
entity, it is challenging to trace-down this mechanism and the findings under this 
mechanism are scarce.  The attractiveness of European standards is felt also in the case 
of Transnistria, and some findings can be pointed out at this stage. However, the 
difficulty that the Transnistrian authorities are facing is the implementation of these 
changes, since these require infrastructural changes and funding as well as time to 
implement these initiatives. Among the implemented changes there can be mentioned 
the environmental, phyto-sanitary, health standards – also described in the transference 
diffusion part, since these have been included in the Confidence Building Measures 
Program. As mentioned previously, some degree of overlapping is in the diffusion 
mechanisms is observed.  
2. Informational  
As an example of information mechanism is the EU visibility in Transnistria. It is 
currently being promoted but is hampered by the local authorities’ reluctance to 
publically acknowledge the EU contribution. This fact is supported by a number of 																																																								
209	Ibid. 
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interviewees from Transnistria: “Several schools, hospitals and kindergartens have been 
renovated with the help of EU funds, but this fact is very weakly reported by our mass-
media sources, it looks like our mass media is avoiding such events, or this kind of 
information seems to be banned. On the contrary, in case of Russian funding, they are 
all reflected in the news 210”. Since Transnistria has no international identity as a stand-
alone state, this mechanism is problematic to single out. The Information diffusion is 
the mechanism when the EU can take a more active role. 
 
3. Procedural  
The procedural diffusion foresees the institutionalization of the relation between the 
EU and a third country, normally by means of trade or membership agreements. From a 
critical point of view, the EU norms are setting the rules that distinguish between the 
right and the wrong in political environment. As previously mentioned in the theoretical 
chapter, the procedural diffusion of norms represents the institutionalization of 
relationships between the EU and third parties and as examples can serve the AAs. In 
this part, the discussion will be on the implications of the AA in Transnistria. Another 
example is the economic and political incentives offered to both Moldova and 
Transnistria, in the form of the DCFTA. 
Due to the fact that the Moldovan authorities do not control the Transnistrian region, a 
special consideration was made to cover Transnistria as well. Implementing the DCFTA 
in Transnistria was problematic due to the differences in the economic system of 
Transnistria, the difference of standards and technical norms. DCFTA is also perceived 
as having a strong geopolitical impact on Transnistria. The expectations for this 
instrument are high: it is expected to produce a decrease of the influence of the Russian 
Federation in the Republic of Moldova, and changes in Transnistria as well. The 
obstacles in this process are the fact that the Transnistrian authorities have taken the 
decision to follow the Russian legal standards and to follow the process of gradual 
integration into the common legal field.   
																																																								
210 Interview with Evgeniy Dunaev, Apriori NGO, Tiraspol 
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The EU has declared that it continues to support a comprehensive, peaceful settlement 
based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova with a special status for 
Transnistria. Transnistria, as part of Moldova, benefits from the EU’s DCFTA Facility, 
focused on support to small and medium business enterprises. The Association 
Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs) were 
concluded in 2014. These have brought the relations between the EU and Moldova to a 
new level. The agreements aim at strengthened political association and economic 
integration. They constitute a plan for reforms that will bring the partner countries close 
to the EU by aligning their legislation and standards to those of the EU.  
 
All trade from Transnistria to the EU was conducted under the Autonomous Trade 
Preferences regime, in a duty-free regime. The condition imposed by the EU for the 
Transnistrian companies to participate in this program was for them to be registered at 
the State Registration Chamber in the Republic of Moldova. The Autonomous Trade 
Preferences system allowed the companies from Transnistria to export to the EU under 
a duty free regime. The Transnistrian authorities had to apply regulatory adjustments, in 
order to continue using the preferences. As a result, quite a big number of Transnistrian 
companies registered with the Moldovan authorities, in order to benefit in continuation 
from the liberalized regime with the EU and be able to export.  
The benefits from Transnistria participation in the EU liberalized trade is the following: 
gradual Europeanization for Transnistria, continuing to improve the relationship 
between Moldova and Transnistria, avoiding EU-Russia relationship crisis, and the 
reduction of excessive geopolitical influence from Russian Federation on the Republic 
of Moldova.  
The economic crisis has played its role in opening Transnistria towards more 
cooperation with the EU by pragmatically accepting the changes to be implemented. 
Even though there was seemingly no other choice then comply with the EU 
requirements, the positive effects are felt and will all contribute to a better economy. 
The norms that the EU is keen to diffuse are considered to be generally accepted as 
these have an universal character.  
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4. Transference 
The diffusion of norms is carried out by means of exchanges of goods, trade, aid or 
technical assistance with third parties through real or financial means. The norm 
diffusion can also be strengthened by use of political conditionality. Examples of 
Transference are the PHARE and TACIS programmes in Central and East Europe211.  
• Confidence Building Measures (CBM)  
Confidence Building Measures is another form of support that the EU is providing to 
Transnistria. The Confidence Building Measures are activities undertaken by the EU in 
coordination with implementing partners – UNDP, IOM. The objectives are to develop 
the communities on both banks, to promote a rapprochement between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol and the dialogue between the two sides. Mediation and confidence-building 
measures are aimed at creating bottom-up trust by expanding or repairing economic and 
social links between Moldova and Transnistria212. Under this program, the EU provides 
28 million Euros over a period of 4 years for the integration of Moldova. The aim of the 
program is to build confidence between the two sides of the Nistru river and 
developments in the rural areas of the security zone. The program, launched in 2013 
aimed at improving institutional and coordination abilities institution and the settlement 
of the Transnistrian conflict by means of awareness building, promoting dialogue with 
civil society on the two banks of the river Nistru. These measures are designed to 
facilitate the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute, by increasing confidence between 
Chisinau and Tiraspol through joint initiatives involving local authorities, civil society 
organizations and other stakeholders from both sides213. 
CBM are designed in form of capacity-building activities, which foresee activities 
aimed at different technical areas, with involvement of European experts, aimed at 
developing a viable civil society. The activities in the program involve participants from 
both banks. The aim is to exchange useful experience, to identify common problems 																																																								
211 European Parliament, Briefing No 33, The PHARE Programme and the enlargement of the European 
Union, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm (accessed 12.08.2017). 
212 Stanislav Secrieru (2011) The Transnistrian conflict – new opportunities and old obstacles for trust 
building (2009–2010), Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11:3, 241-263 
213 European Commission official webpage, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/419/eastern-partnership_en (accessed 05.04.2017).  
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and to create solutions. The program runs in partnership with the Chisinau authorities, 
and the Tiraspol authorities, local NGOs. The aim was to open the dialogue between the 
two banks and to promote a solid partnership. With the help of European experts, the 
European standards are promoted and the outcome is the development of a strong civil 
society on both banks. According to experts’ opinion: “confidence building measures 
are the most tangible and consistent from the point of view of their impact. Without 
negotiations we cannot find common ground and we cannot quit the status quo, that is 
why the negotiations are important to break the ice between parties” 214.  
The EU has launched the Confidence building measures, since the restart of the 
negotiations since 2011. These measures also included the gradual review of EU 
sanction on Transnistria, the ban on movements applied to the leaders of administration. 
This ban on movements was stopped by the decision of the EU Council, to allow the 
leaders of Transnistria to take part at negotiations, on the territory of the EU. (reference 
Council Decision 2011/641/CFSP, amending the Decision concerning restrictive 
measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region).  
 
From 2012 – until 2017 was carried out the 3rd phase of the Confidence Building 
Measures Programme, funded by the EU and co-funded by the UNDP office in 
Moldova. The contribution for the third phase is valued at 10.6 million Euro, out of 
which the EU contributes by 9,5 million and the UNDP – 1.1 million215.  The general 
objective was to increase confidence between the both banks of the Nistru River by 
means of enhanced social and economic development, by involving local authorities, 
civil society, business community and the stakeholders. The results, according to the 
report216 stated that there was evidence in positive results in each of the components of 
the program, which are: Business development Component; Community Development 
Component; Environment Component; Support to Civil Society Component. 
 																																																								214	Interview by the author with Denis Cenusa, expert at Pro-Expert Group Think tank.		
215 Support to Confidence Building Measures Program IV), 2015-2018, 
http://www.md.undp.org/content/moldova/en/home/projects/confidence-building-measures-programme-
4.html (accessed 08.07.2017). 
216 Project Document: “Support to Confidence Building Measures 2015-2017, EU-UNDP, Increased 
opportunities and better living conditions across Nistru river, 
http://www.md.undp.org/content/dam/moldova/docs/Project%20Documents/Pro_doc%20CBM4.pdf 
(accessed 17.09.2017). 
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According to a recent independent evaluation of the Confidence Building Measures 
Programme217, there have been considerable achievements in social infrastructure 
reaching in excess of 100 000 people, business development, trading relationships, the 
grants have reached numerous people and established reinforced cross-river 
partnerships and links. Examples of such activities are: cross-river cooperation of local 
authorities, business and individual links that have been established through the 
program.  
 
The outcome, stated by the report evaluates the program as highly relevant, with 
achievements at each of the components. The first component results number among all, 
the study visits to EU countries for entrepreneurs, 52 new partnerships negotiated, out 
of which 15 were cross-river, more Transnistrian companies joining the Moldovan 
Chamber of Commerce; a Business School sub-component being finalized providing 40 
training programs covering a range of business topics. The team of 16 trainers was 
supported by international experts. Joint international study visits were conducted to EU 
states. The Youth grant scheme sub-component aimed at development of young 
entrepreneurs. The Rural tourism subcomponent benefitted from the program by 
opening 23 new bed and breakfast enterprises – which were equally distributed on both 
banks of the Nistru River. The third component – empowered local communities and 
actors from both sides: this component has produced 40 new projects, 62 full-time jobs, 
and quality of life of 100 000 people were improved. The health project targeting 
Transnistria region: equipment has been purchased; training has been provided; access 
to services has been provided. Besides, the environmental component: 4 project 
proposals developed. The Dialogue sub-component: the dialogue process has created a 
cross-river platform for civil society experts, professionals. This project assembled 80 
representatives from both banks and 18 projects have been outlined.  
 
According to the report, the CBM programme, despite the expected and experienced 
challenges, demonstrates considerable effectiveness. An increased people-to people 
contact was provided, cross-river trade, cross-river contractual relationships, and 																																																								
217 Evaluation of Confidence Building Measures Programme Moldova, 2013-2017, Final Project, 
10/2014, https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/6726 (accessed 12.09.2017). 
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development of the business spheres, youth development, environmental projects, 
cultural events, development of child protection policies. According to the findings of 
the report, these activities are to be maintained in the future. Investments have been 
made to infrastructure and the replacement of outdated equipment, and improvements in 
the quality of life for people have been registered. Also, CBM supported small 
businesses, facilitated improved environment for business development. Interestingly, 
the Evaluation Report on CBM report218 notifies that there is clear evidence that the 
people to people exchanges have led to questioning of the presentation of the status quo 
and resulted in increased openness to cross-river interaction. These measures were to 
eventually solidify bottom-up trust.  
 
5. Overt diffusion  
The idea of an international peace keeping force in Transnistria was voiced before, and 
this could have served as an example of overt diffusion, but the idea was not approved 
by the EU. Transnistria would like to have a more direct interaction with the EU in fact, 
in order to promote a better understanding between parties. As one of the interviewees 
voiced his opinion: “I am more than sure that the role of the EU will be better 
understood in Tiraspol. Until now, the majority of the projects are carried out with the 
help of the partners from Chisinau. And as a result, the picture is distorted” 219.  
6. Cultural filter  
The final factor described for the diffusion of EU norms is the cultural filter.  
Examples of findings of cultural filter, applied in the case of Transnistria are presented 
below: 
• Death penalty abolition: 
Since 1998 the EU has played a leading role in international abolishing of the death 
penalty and according to Manners, this fact represents an example of the normative 
																																																								
218 Evaluation of Confidence Building Measures Programme Moldova, Final Project 2013-2017, 12/2014, 
https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/6726, p. 39 (accessed 12.09.2017).  
219 Interview with Anatoly Dirun, Director of the School for Political Research from Tiraspol 
	 82 
power of the EU220. Although Transnistria cannot be party to international treaties, 
human rights treaties, there has been notified the unilateral recognition of international 
treaties through decisions in the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria221. The mentioned 
treaties are the European Convention of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child, UN Convention on 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The authorities are regarding 
these treaties as part of their legislation de facto, but according to Hammarberg222 the 
main problem is in the implementation of the agreed standards.  
The death penalty is de facto abolished by means of an executive decree issued in 
1999223, with references to recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly in the preamble (reference), reference made to the principles of humans and 
the inalienable human right to life. Although, the Criminal Code still stipulates the 
possibility of death penalty in article 58. In practice, the moratorium decree is 
overriding the Criminal Code and the death penalty is replaced by imprisonment for 
life.  
• Education  
Some influences in the education policies can be found in Transnistria as well. Despite 
the fact that the Transnistrian authorities are oriented towards the educational space of 
the Russian Federation, and strive to adopt the Russian educational standards, 
Transnistria has accepted some Bologna Process criteria. Experiments in education 
implemented in higher education institutions in Transnistria have been debated by local 
experts: “The implementation of the Bologna process in the Transnistrian region is 
challenging. Unfortunately there have not been created necessary institutions for the 
proper implementation of the Bologna System”224. 
																																																								220	Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 	
221 Hammarberg, Thomas, and UN Senior Expert. "Report on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region 
of the Republic of Moldova." United Nations 14 (2013). 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224IDIS-Viitorul webpage, http://viitorul.org/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=132&id=5361&t=/STI-RI-I-
EVENIMENTE-IDIS/Educatia-punte-de-legatura-intre-cele-doua-maluri-ale-Nistrului  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The EU applies normative power to influence countries towards democratization 
process. The EU creates incentives and provides standards and norms for other 
countries and enhances commitment from the partner country. The tools that the EU 
uses are the political dialogue, the support of democracy and creation of incentives for 
democratic change. The aim of the thesis was to identify if and how does normative 
power Europe influence on the developments in Transnistria. The author first presented 
the framework for analysis, being the normative power Europe diffusion mechanisms, 
applied through the prism of the ENP and EaP.  
 
As a conclusion, procedural, transference diffusion and some elements of the cultural 
filter are present in the case of Transnistria and the EU has used strong financial, 
political, diplomatic as well as conditionality. This paper shows the way ENP uses its 
normative power and the way it is diffused using its mechanisms. A future suggestion is 
to have a revision on how the EU uses its power, its efficiency in order to keep 
continuity. The most significant forms of norm diffusion exerted by EU on Transnistria 
are the Transference and the Procedural diffusion.  
 
Given the findings stated above, it can be concluded that the EU did exert normative 
power over Transnistria, which played an important role in signing of the DCFTA, 
through the activity of EU organizations in the region. The norms diffused by the EU 
have been defined in line with Manner’s theories and democracy, rule of law and human 
rights - three of his stated “core norms” of the EU - have been chosen to delimit the 
thesis. Despite the difficult task of proving a direct causal link between the EU 
conditionality and the reforms made by Transnistria, the paper shows favorable effects 
that mostly represent a bottom-up approach with their effects to continue to appear in 
the long run. What is important to mention is that the changes take time to implement, 
and usually the effects are not visible at once as the EU is applying the small steps 
strategy. The EU power has been acknowledged cooperation is accepted. 
 																																																																																																																																																																		
(accessed 04.08.2017). 	
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To summarize, even though the EU has a vast potential in Transnistria to produce 
change, it is increasingly having difficulty on its way, and the changes are produced at a 
slow pace and the effects are still expected to be produced. The main finding is that the 
normative power Europe works in the example of Transnistria, but in a more narrow 
way.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Interview questions: 
 
1. Could you tell me a little about yourself and your work? 
 
2. Please describe how EU is engaged in Transnistria? 
a. What are EU’s intentions towards Transnistria? 
b. What do you think is the main reasons behind EUs involvement in 
Transnistria? 
c. What kind of activities does EU undertake in/towards Transnistria? 
i. In terms of democracy promotion 
ii. In the field of regional development 
d. Who is the main target of these activities? 
i. How many and what kind of activities target the civil society? 
ii. How many and what kind of activities aim to target the state 
structures of Transnistria? 
e. How do EU actions in Transnistria relate to the Transnistrian-Moldovan 
relations and address the ongoing conflict? 
f. How do EU actions in Transnistria relate to the Transnistrian-Russian 
relations? 
 
3. Overall, how would you evaluate the consistency of EU’s intentions and actions 
towards Transnistria since 2007, when Moldova/Transnistria became immediate 
neighbors of the EU? 
a. If there have been any changes, then what kind and when? 
b. If there have been changes, then what are in your opinion the reasons 
behind them? Bigger policy changes on the EU level or changes on the 
local level? 
 
4. Overall, how would you evaluate the success of EU’s actions in Transnistria? 
a. Can you name actions that have been more successful, and actions that 
have not worked? 
	 91 
i. In terms of democracy promotion 
ii. In terms of promoting regional development 
iii. Actions that are targeting the civil society 
iv. Actions that are targeting the state structures 
 
5. If EU actions in Transnistria have failed, then what in your opinion would be the 
main reasons for that? 
 
6. How would you evaluate the influence of Russia (in terms of EU’s success or 
failure in Transnistria)? 																																
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